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This dissertation establishes and defends three positions: (1) The question ‘What is the 
meaning of life?’ is a request for a global-metaphysical explanation for life and 
existence that narrates across those elements of most existential import to human 
beings, and this is distinct from the question ‘How may I attain meaning in my life?’; 
(2) The former question is a legitimate one to ask, despite some of the strongest and 
most prominent arguments that claim otherwise; (3) For this question to be answerable 
in principle, even if not in practice, we must hold either to (a) empirical idealism, direct 
external realism, or indirect external realism, all of which must be held as 
transcendentally real, or (b) a form of transcendental idealism that allows for direct 
perception of the world in itself, or that allows for us to infer things about the world in 
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So much of our lives is meaningless, a self-cancelling vacillation and 
futility; we strive with the chaos about us and within; but we would 
believe all the while that there is something vital and significant in us, 
could we but decipher our own souls. 
— Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy, 1961: v 
 
I considered all that my hands had done and all the toil I had expended 
in doing it, and behold, all was vanity and a striving after wind, and 
there was nothing to be gained under the sun. 
— Ecclesiastes, n.d.  
We have been searching for, affirming, and denying the ‘meaning of life’ since at least 
as far back as the book of Ecclesiastes in the Bible, even if it was not referred to as the 
‘meaning of life’ at the time. Whether you agree with the previous sentence depends on 
what you think the question ‘What is the meaning of life?’ is asking for. I think that it is 
requesting a global-metaphysical explanation for life and existence that narrates across 
those elements of most existential import to human beings, and I argue for this 
conception in Chapter 2.  
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Such an explanation for the meaning of life, I argue, must involve significance, 
intelligibility, and purpose, in that it must answer: (1) whether, to what extent, and in 
what way we are significant; (2) what our purpose is; (3) how we might understand life 
and existence in general, i.e. how existence is rendered intelligible. I take this trifecta 
from Seachris (Seachris and Kim, 2018). It must also narrate across elements of 
existential import to us – something I also take from Seachris (2009). In arguing this, I 
also distinguish a meaning of life from meaning in life in 2.2., where the former is a 
request for an ultimate explanation of the framework for existence and the latter is a 
request for an explanation from within the framework of existence, or with this 
framework of existence already presupposed. 
But already there are objections to this conception of a meaning of life. In Chapter 3 I 
look at two prominent arguments against the coherency of the concept of a meaning of 
life – one from Ayer and one from Edwards. Ayer (Ayer, 1947) argues that the concept 
of a meaning of life is illegitimate (and therefore that the question of the meaning of life 
is senseless) because any explanation for existence would answer the ‘how’ but not the 
‘why’, and any possible meaning of life would have to be something that we ourselves 
choose. In 3.1. I argue that the claim that a meaning of life would answer the ‘how’ but 
not the ‘why’ of existence is unfounded, and that this argument therefore begs the 
question. Edwards (1972) argues it makes no sense to ask for a meaning of life because 
this is requesting for something that explains everything, and for something to explain 
everything it must exist outside of everything, but there can be nothing that exists 
outside of everything. I reject this argument in 3.2. on the basis that a necessary being 
like god, for example, could constitute something that does not exist outside of 
everything and yet would explain everything. 
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Apart from arguing that the question of the meaning of life is senseless for these 
reasons, it might also be claimed that the question is either pointless to ask or senseless 
because we could never know an answer even if there were one in reality. This position 
is most likely to arise from a transcendental idealist or correlationist metaphysics. In 
Chapter 4 I outline the transcendental idealist position and why such a position renders 
the world as it is in itself unknowable. In Chapter 5 I explore the implications that this 
inaccessibility of the world in itself would have on the possibility of ever knowing the 
meaning of life, arguing that transcendental idealism and correlationism prima facie 
renders the existence, non-existence, or nature of a  meaning of life epistemically 
inaccessible.  
Finally, in Chapter 6 I outline some metaphysics that allow for epistemic optimism 
regarding the meaning of life, i.e. those metaphysical and epistemological positions that 
allow for knowing a meaning of life in principle even if not in practice. These positions 
are either transcendentally realist forms of idealism, direct external realism, or indirect 
external realism, or they are forms of transcendental idealism that allow for either direct 
experience of the world in itself, or inference about the world in itself despite its 
experiential inaccessibility. Taken as a whole, this thesis argues that the question “What 
is the meaning of life?” is a legitimate and meaningful question that we can in principle 
discover the answer to, providing we accept one of the aforementioned metaphysics. 
Once this is established, and providing we accept one of these metaphysics, we can then 
admit the possibility in principle of discovering an answer to the meaning of life that 
narrates across those questions and elements of most existential import to us, which is 
what an answer to the meaning of life must, I argue, provide. This idea of narrating 
across elements of most existential import is developed in section 2.3, but for now it 
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suffices to say that a meaning of life, should one exist, would have to be something that 
answers the sorts of questions that one might pose in an existential crisis, such as the 
significance and purpose of death, suffering, and of our life projects and ambitions. 
These elements are common to all of humanity, as they are non-person-specific, and if 
it is possible to know a meaning of life in principle we can therefore be 
epistemologically optimistic about finding an answer to those questions of most 
existential import to all of us.  
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1 The meaning of the question 
If we think that there is something to be said for the salience of ‘meaning of life’ talk, 
we might ask what is this meaning of life talk? Importantly, in order for us to speculate 
about the first-order question ‘what is the meaning of life?’, we must first have an 
answer to the second second-order question ‘what is the meaning of the question of the 
meaning of life?’. In answering this second-order question, I draw upon thinkers who 
have already done a lot of the legwork. Through this meta-analysis, I outline common 
ways of understanding the term ‘meaning’, allowing us to analyse what is meant by ‘the 
meaning of life’ more fully. 
1.1  The meaning of ‘meaning’ 
Nozick (1981: 574-5) divides ‘meaning’ talk into eight different categories. These 
categories cover the different ways we usually use the word ‘meaning’. Meaning, he 
says, may be used to denote the following. 
1. External causal relationship (such as in “this means war”).  
2. External referential or semantic relation (“brother means male 
sibling”).  
3. Intention or purpose (“he meant well”).  
4. Lesson (“Gandhi’s success means that nonviolent techniques 
sometimes can win over force”).  
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5. Personal significance, importance, value or mattering (“you 
mean a lot to me”).  
6. Objective meaningfulness (importance, significance or meaning 
which is grounded objectively, rather than subjectively as with 
personal significance).  
7. Intrinsic meaningfulness (the same as 6, but the ground for its 
objectivity comes only from itself, and not from its connection 
to anything else).  
8. Total, resultant meaning (the sum total of ‘meanings’ 1-7).  
Seachris (Seachris and Kim, 2018: 2) divides ‘meaning’ into three, rather than eight, 
distinct categories of use. 
9. “Intelligibility-Meaning”, such as: “What did you mean by that 
statement?”.  
10. “Purpose-Meaning”, such as: “I really mean it”.  
11. “Significance-Meaning”, such as: “That was such a meaningful 
conversation”.  
The different types of meaning expressed in Nozick’s list may be placed under 
Seachris’s own three categories. Under intelligibility-meaning, we may place Nozick’s 
categories 1, 2, and 4. Nozick’s category 1 denotes an ‘external causal relationship’, 
such that the phrase ‘this means war’ signifies an act which has caused another. This is 
an example of intelligibility-meaning because a request for a cause is a request for an 
explanation which renders the entire cause and effect scenario intelligible. His category 
2 denotes an ‘external referential or semantic relation’, such that the phrase ‘brother 
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means male sibling’ signifies a relation between the term and its definition. This is 
intelligibility-meaning because a request for such a semantic relation is a request which 
would render the term in question intelligible. Finally, category 4 denotes a ‘lesson’, 
such that ‘Gandhi’s success means that nonviolent techniques sometimes can win over 
force’ signifies a lesson to be learnt from this particular scenario or story. This is 
intelligibility-meaning because a request for such a lesson is a request to bring another 
level of understanding (i.e. intelligibility) to an already partially understood situation. 
Under purpose-meaning we may place only category 3. This category denotes ‘purpose’ 
such that ‘he meant well’ signifies a purpose or type of purpose which one person 
intended. 
Under significance-meaning there are categories 5, 6 and 7. Category 5 denotes 
‘personal significance, importance, value or mattering’, such that ‘you mean a lot to 
me’ signifies a personal significance that one person has to another. Categories 6 and 7 
are also types of significance-meaning since they are merely extensions of category 5. 
Category 6, ‘objective meaningfulness’, signifies a type of significance-meaning which 
is grounded objectively, and category 7, ‘intrinsic meaningfulness’, signifies a type of 
significance-meaning which is an extension of the previous category, in that it is a type 
of significance-meaning which is grounded objectively, but this objectivity comes from 
itself. 
This leaves only category 8, ‘total, resultant meaning’: ‘the sum total of ‘meanings’ 1-
7’. This category encompasses all the rest, and even encompasses all three of Seachris’ 
broader categories. This is what we get when we know the meaning of something in all 
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its different formulations. To understand the meaning of something in this way is to 
understand everything about it and its context. For example, we might know the total, 
resultant meaning of a selfless act of love from a father to a child if we were to say the 
following: First, that we know the cause of this act, being the love of the father, and its 
effect, being the happiness of the child; second, that we understand what the phrase a 
‘selfless act of love’ means and what its terms refer to; third, that we understand the 
intention of the father; fourth, that we may learn a lesson from his actions; fifth, that his 
action expressed the significance of his child to him; sixth, that this significance of the 
act does not just come from himself but from, for example, the objective value of love; 
seventh, that the significance of this act, and thereby the value of love, is something 
which is intrinsically meaningful. 
In order to clarify how I have ordered and correlated these categories I have created a 




One thing common to much contemporary analytic meaning of life study is the use of 
meaning as referring only to those final two columns: purpose-meaning and 
significance-meaning. Metz, for example, takes for granted that at the most fundamental 
level a meaningful life is synonymous with a life that is “important”, “significant”, that 
“matters” or “has a point” (2013b: 80) It is true that he develops and interrogates this 
concept of meaningfulness further, but he ignores as presumably irrelevant that use of 
meaning that acts as a request for an explanation or to render something intelligible and 
understandable. This seems peculiar not least because, as Munitz points out, “In 
everyday language, the expressions “find intelligible,” “understand,” and “know the 
meaning of” are frequently used interchangeably in a variety of situations.” (1993: 15). 
Munitz’s own discussion of the meaning of ‘meaning’ is short but insightful. He points 
out that there may be two ways in which we use the word ‘meaning’. First, we may use 
it “to make sense of what some linguistic or other symbol means.” (ibid., his emphasis). 
In such a case, asking for the meaning of life would merely be asking for an explanation 
of the use(s) of the expression “life”. The second way he says we use it is to adopt a 
“philosophy of human life” (his emphasis), where we want an explanation of life – we 
want it to answer to ““the point of it all,” “significance,” “value,” “being worthwhile,” 
and “purpose.”” (ibid.: 16). 
At first glance, this seems to miss out those intelligibility-meaning uses of which he had 
previously reminded us. However, he goes on to say that asking for an explanation, 
such as asking for the meaning of life, can “point in two different directions” (ibid.). It 
may, on the one hand, point backwards to a cause or causes; or it may point forwards to 
life’s values, purpose(s), goals and how these are all determined. Notably, we see that a 
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cause may be posited as an answer to something’s meaning, which acts to make it 
intelligible and explain it. In this way, looking backwards may provide intelligibility-
meaning, and looking forwards may provide purpose-meaning or significance-meaning. 
We may also note that, in looking forwards to (for example) life’s purpose(s), we may 
be forced also to look back for its cause(s). The most important insight to take from 
Munitz, then, for our purposes, is the idea that these different uses of ‘meaning’ may be 
conceptually different, but still interrelated. We may be asking for a purpose (or telos), 
but in order to find this purpose, we may have to look backwards for a cause (or nisus): 
something which renders our lives intelligible. 
We may also, looking back upon the diagram of categories, reflect upon the fact that 
one category contained within the intelligibility-meaning column is that of ‘external 
referential or semantic relation’. Reminding ourselves of these terms, this category 
refers to cases of synonymy, reference, or symbolism. Considering our need to 
remember the intelligibility-meaning usage, our ordinary use of ‘meaning’ as denoting 
synonymous phrases (‘brother means male sibling’) may therefore serve us better than 
we realise in answering apparently to non-linguistic meaning requests. As Leach and 
Tartaglia point out, “perhaps, for instance, [the question of life’s meaning] invites us to 
compare human life [. . .] to a linguistic code in need of deciphering.” (2018: 275). In 
any case, the meaning of ‘meaning’ in the question of life’s meaning is not so obviously 
separate from its other, more ordinary uses. 
Let us reiterate the most important points. First, we have seen that there are a number of 
ways that we can use the word ‘meaning’, and that these different uses may belong to 
multiple categories of use at the same time (for example, ‘What is the meaning of this?’ 
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might be said to be both a request for intention, but also a request to render the situation 
intelligible). Second, we have seen that there are different levels from which we can 
view and categorise meaning talk, being either broader or more specific. We can speak 
of significance-meaning, but we can also speak more specifically about personal 
significance, objective meaningfulness, or intrinsic meaningfulness; and we might also 
look at meaning holistically as the sum-total of many or all of the different ways of 
using the word. Third, we have seen how intelligibility-meaning is often taken to be 
inconsequential to life’s meaning, and that attention is given primarily to purpose-
meaning and significance-meaning by many thinkers in the field. 
1.2 A plurality of questions? 
Now that we have some idea regarding what might be meant when someone uses the 
word ‘meaning’, we must pose the question: When we ask specifically for the meaning 
of life, are we asking a singular question, a question that sensibly unifies a plurality of 
other related questions, or are we asking a plurality of questions that cannot be sensibly 
unified, rendering the question senseless?  
If we think that the question is a single unified request, the view is that we are giving 
multiple interrelated requests sensibly collected under a single term: ‘the meaning of 
life’. With the other pluralist understanding – that the question is an amalgam of 
distinct, non-unifiable requests – when we ask for the meaning of life we are asking 
many distinct things at once, grouping together questions that cannot be sensibly asked 
together. If we hold to the former understanding, which we might call a type of monism 
regarding the question, we may be reminded of something like Aristotle’s categories of 
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causation, through which there can be different, distinct understandings of a particular 
thing’s cause, and yet a singular understanding of this thing requires a unified 
understanding of its causes. It requires understanding them all. Also recall Nozick’s 
notion of total, resultant meaning, where a request for meaning under this understanding 
would be the ‘sum total’ of interrelated meaning requests. This understanding of 
meaning would hold to the former, unified conception. 
This being the case, we now see that the unified understanding of the question is not 
necessarily the same as any conception which argues that it is a singular request: it must 
also affirm that this singular request is a unification of other related requests or 
elements. For one could reasonably think that asking for the meaning of life is asking a 
singular question, such as ‘what is the purpose of life?’, but that it is not asking a 
unified one which represents the totality of some or all related requests. The amalgam 
thesis – a pluralist thesis that denies the possibility for sensible unification of the 
different requests – denies the possibility for a unified and monistic interpretation of the 
question of life’s meaning on the basis that the various requests posed under the 
umbrella of the meaning of life cannot be sensibly asked together, so that what is really 
being asked is a number of non-unifiable questions. The unified approach – the monist 
thesis – is also pluralist, but asserts that this unification is possible and sensible under 
the umbrella of the meaning of life. 
What, then, of the person who denies the unified nature of the question of the meaning 
of life, but nevertheless thinks that there is a separate and distinct question which 
accurately represents the request for life’s meaning? This conceptual space is one I 
believe the literature has not properly addressed (perhaps because few philosophers 
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holds such a view), and so merely for convenience I think it is beneficial to give this 
position a name. I elect to call this position ‘particularism’, and, following this, to call 
its proponent a ‘particularist’, since they are saying that the question of life’s meaning 
is, in fact, asking a particular question. Unlike the pluralist, the particularist thinks that 
the question of the meaning of life is a sensible question, but, unlike the monist, denies 
that the question is a unification of other interrelated requests or elements. 
Let us take a moment to recap. There is one type of pluralist who proposes the 
‘amalgam thesis’. This person sees the question as a placeholder for a plurality of 
different requests, such as for ‘purpose’, ‘importance’, ‘cause’ or ‘how one should live’, 
and they deny the possibility of unification into a singular request. Then there is the 
monist, another type of pluralist. This person sees the question as a unified request, and 
thinks that there is something specific to the request itself which justifies unification 
under the single question of the meaning of life. The difference between these two 
positions is that where the former does not think that unification is possible, the latter 
thinks that it is possible and is actually the case. The amalgam theorist sees unification 
as impossible, and therefore that the question of the meaning of life is not a distinct 
question at all. The monist sees that the question of life’s meaning is a unified one, and 
therefore that it serves as a question in its own right. The final type of person I have 
called a ‘particularist’, who neither believes that the question of the meaning of life is a 
unification of interrelated elements, nor that it is a cluster of non-unifiable requests or 





2  Answers to the question 
Now that we have gone some way to understanding what it means to ask the question 
‘What is the meaning of life?’, we may begin to look at how we might classify different 
types of answer. First, I outline some common distinctions that are drawn between 
types of answer to the question, then I argue for a fundamental and primary distinction 
between answers to ‘the meaning of life’ and answers to ‘meaning in life’, where the 
former is understood as a global-metaphysical explanation for life and existence that 
narrates across those elements of most existential import to human beings. Because the 
former is the primary focus of the remainder of this thesis, properly outlining this 
distinction is crucial. Finally, I explain why, for the ‘meaning-of’ question, 
intelligibility-meaning plays a central role in the unification of different related 
elements of existential import. 
2.1  Common distinctions 
Seachris distinguishes between ‘global’ and ‘local’ answers to the question of life’s 
meaning. He tells us that the former ‘global’ type of answer will seek to “render the 
universe and our lives within it intelligible” (2013: 4) and that as such it seeks “a deep 
explanation, context, or narrative through which to interpret existence” (ibid.). We see 
here the link with Seachris’ categories of meaning-use discussed in Section 1.1. Global 
meaning fits nicely into that oft-neglected column of ‘intelligibility-meaning’. ‘Local’ 
meaning Seachris places alongside ‘individualist’ meaning, which he describes as 
“normative” (ibid.). He says that, when asking this local question, we are asking “what 
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we must, or should, or ought to order our lives around so as to render them meaningful” 
(ibid.). 
Closely related to this distinction is another, between “holistic” answers and 
“individualistic” ones (Metz, 2013a: 24). “Holistic” answers are ones that ask “about 
the universe or about the human race as a species”, while “individualist” answers ask 
“about one of us” (ibid.). In other words, the holistic answer is answering what the 
meaning of life is for the human species as a whole, and individualist answers tell us 
how an individual may live to make their life more or less meaningful. Metz also notes 
that, in the literature, it is only usually the latter, individualist conception that is said to 
have an “evaluative” or normative dimension (i.e., that says life’s meaning is about 
something desirable). The meaning that one may accrue in one’s own life is usually 
seen as positive, whereas any holistic answer to the meaning of life for the species as a 
whole is usually regarded as non-evaluative, i.e. purely descriptive – it is simply 
something that is the case, and is neither positive or negative. Metz does also say that 
the notion of an evaluative-holistic answer could do with further exploration in the 
literature (ibid.), and I agree. For instance, one might argue that the purpose that a god 
constituted of absolute good gives us would be a holistic answer (an answer for the 
species as a whole) but also evaluative, because such an answer would by its nature be a 
good one, since any meaning that an absolutely good god gives us would have to be 
good. 
We can see that the global-local and holist-individualist distinctions are closely tied. 
Both distinctions are primarily ones of scale, in that the global and holist answers are 
answers to a larger scale question (concerning the species as a whole, or existence in its 
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entirety), and the local and individualist answers are answers to a smaller scale question 
(concerning the individual). The only clear difference between the distinctions, at least 
insofar as their respective proponents describe them, is that global answers seem to be 
ones of intelligibility-meaning, whereas holist answers are not restricted just to this 
category, and may be ones of purpose-meaning or significance-meaning also. However, 
in section 2.3. I explain why we may consider intelligibility-meaning as overarching all 
other types of meaning when we request a holistic meaning of life, and so this 
difference between the distinctions becomes dissolved. As such, and bearing in mind 
their overlap, from here onwards I treat global as synonymous with holistic, and local as 
synonymous with individualistic. 
We also see the possibility that an answer to the global question might provide an 
answer to the local one, because a deep explanation through which to interpret existence 
might tell us how we should order our lives in order to render them meaningful. This is 
an asymmetric relation, however, since a local answer could never guarantee a global 
one. It is true that if we somehow discovered an answer to the local question of life’s 
meaning, we might be more inclined towards a particular global answer, but this would 
never be a necessary conclusion to draw, and would not ensure that the global answer is 
correct. If we were to say, for example, that it is meaningful for a person to order their 
life around kindness and compassion, we might find reason to be inclined towards a 
global answer such as that of an omnibenevolent god, but this would not necessarily 
have to be the case.  
In fact, even if we somehow discovered that not only is kindness and compassion 
objectively meaningful (a local answer), but also that this fact guarantees the existence 
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of a god (a global answer), then this relationship, extending from the local to the global, 
would be an epistemological one, not an ontological one. It would not be that the local 
answer ontologically guarantees the global answer, it would merely be that the local 
answer allows us to uncover the truth of the global answer. The global answer, on the 
other hand, would provide this ontological guarantee. The global answer is 
ontologically prior to the local one, but not vice versa.  In this way we can say, 
providing these stipulations, that the global-local relation is asymmetrical, and that the 
local answer may be given by the global, but not vice versa. 
One further distinction that deserves mentioning, also tied closely to the global-local 
one, is Tartaglia’s distinction between ‘metaphysical’ and ‘social’ meaning (2016). 
Metaphysical answers, in short, answer the question: “What are we here for?” (ibid.: 2). 
Social answers are ones which tell us “how to make our lives more meaningful” (ibid.: 
3), where this meaning comes from social relations. Social answers, as opposed to 
metaphysical ones, are ones that answer from within our framework when it is already 
presupposed, and are social in nature. They ask: ‘What may I do from within my 
context of social relations in order to make my life more meaningful?’. 
I will stick with the global-local distinction rather than this one, but the metaphysical-
social distinction does serve to point out that the nature of the local question is 
primarily a social one. This is important philosophically because it helps us to reflect 
upon the difference between local answers to life’s meaning as evaluative ones, and 
global answers to life’s meaning as descriptive ones. It helps us to understand the 
distinction as one which runs throughout all philosophy: between how we should act, 
and what we know to be the case. And, remember, the latter may provide ontological
19 
1What is meant by ‘philosophical’ is a controversial topic, but one thing is clear, namely that 
reflections on scientific conceptions of the world themselves are philosophical, and therefore 
pursuing our line of questioning to its final end, which would call into question any scientific 
framework itself, is philosophical. I would, of course, admit that any naturalistic explanation 
which demonstrably cannot be questioned further, due to its own nature, would be a good 
candidate for a suitably philosophical answer to the meaning of life, since to come to such a 
conclusion would involve reflection upon the nature of the scientific framework itself, rather 
than taking it as a given. 
ground for the former, but not the other way around. At this point we might question 
whether a global answer would have to be a metaphysical one. Could not, for instance, 
a naturalistic explanation and purpose for our existence suffice? One might argue that 
our species is here today because we have survived the Darwinian process of evolution, 
and, courtesy of this process, our purpose is simply to carry on surviving and 
reproducing. This might be considered a global answer, since it answers to the species 
as a whole, and yet it would be entirely naturalistic. Whether this is a sufficiently global 
answer or not merely depends on the scope of the question you are asking. But a 
naturalistic answer such as that of evolution is insufficient because it does not provide 
ultimate teleological justification: Why is the evolutionary explanation itself 
meaningful? Why should we consider a purely mechanical explanation our final end? 
From such a mechanical explanation of our existence there is no telos and no normative 
aspect, only brute explanation which is cut short before any final or ultimate answer. 
So, whilst a global answer may be naturalistic, such an answer would not be suitably 
philosophical1 in the way that the question of the meaning of life requires. As such, we 
might add the stipulation that, unless the naturalist can provide good reasons to think 
that any attempt to move beyond the naturalistic picture is conceptually confused, the 
philosophical question of the global meaning of life, when interpreted in this manner, 
must be metaphysical. There are further ways of distinguishing between types of 
answer to the question, but these are mostly either variations of the global-local
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distinction, or otherwise ways of distinguishing between different types of local answer. 
For instance, Seachris divides answers to this local question into four categories: 
supernaturalism (orientating your life towards god’s purpose), objective naturalism 
(orientating your life towards objectively meaningful and mind-independent but 
nevertheless natural things), subjective naturalism (orientating your life towards 
whatever you find subjectively meaningful), and pessimistic naturalism (i.e. nihilism, 
that there is no meaning in life since nothing has any value) (2013: 11-13). For the 
purposes of this thesis, however, we may focus only upon the broader distinction 
between global/metaphysical and local/social answers. 
2.2 The meaning of life and meaning in life 
We have seen that there are two broad ways in which we may distinguish answers to the 
question of life’s meaning. First, there are global answers which answer to the species 
or existence as a whole. These answers, in order to suitably answer the philosophical 
question of the meaning of life, must be metaphysical as they must not take the 
framework of existence as a given. Second, there are local answers which attempt to tell 
us how individuals might live in order to make their lives more meaningful. These 
answers are social as opposed to metaphysical since they arise from within our already 
existing social framework. We have also seen that while a global answer may guarantee 
a local one this is an asymmetric relation because a local answer cannot guarantee a 
global one. To the extent that a local answer might somehow tell us the global answer, 
this is only ever an epistemological relation, not an ontological one.
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1The ‘wideness’ of the distinction here simply refers to whether there is any overlap between 
the two types of answer, and if so, how much overlap. In other words, it refers to how distinct 
the two questions are. 
The question now is this. Given that there is a distinction between global and local 
answers, is this distinction sufficiently wide1 for us to consider these two types of 
answer responses to two separate and distinct questions? In other words, is the 
difference between global and local answers wide enough for us to say that they are not 
answering the same question at all? I believe this to be the case, and that global answers 
are answering the question ‘What is the meaning of life?’, whereas local answers are 
answering the question ‘how may I attain more meaning in my life?’. Correlated with 
the distinction between global and local answers, then, are the questions of the meaning 
of life, and of meaning in life, respectively. 
Let us consider just how wide the global-local distinction is. A global answer to the 
philosophical question of the meaning of life will be metaphysical in nature: it will tell 
us something about the ultimate nature of reality and our place and purpose in it. A 
local answer, on the other hand, will tell us how an individual might order their life in 
order to make it more meaningful. We could potentially have local meaning (for 
example ‘to live your life authentically’) without global meaning. There have been 
many philosophers, in fact, who have attempted to demonstrate just this – who have 
argued for local meaning given the lack of any global meaning. Indeed, the entire post-
Nietzschean, existentialist branch of philosophy might convincingly be argued to be a 
response to the ‘death’ of the metaphysical conception of life’s meaning, by replacing it 
with a local and social conception (Young, 2014). Whether or not this specific 
understanding of the history of philosophy is maintained, the point stands that local 
answers have traditionally been understood as a potential way of retaining meaning in
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our lives despite the lack of any global, metaphysical meaning. The distinctness of these 
conceptions is therefore implicit. Of course, we could only successfully replace one 
type of answer with another if they were answers to the same question. If we think 
philosophers have attempted to replace the one type of answer with another, but also 
that these two types of answer are answers to different questions, then we must also 
think these philosophers were and are incorrect to think of the one type of answer as a 
replacement for the other. That these two answers are arguably historically distinct is 
not proof that they are answers to separate questions, rather it goes to illuminate the 
distinctness of the two types of answer, because it shows that we may have a local 
answer even without a global one.  
In order to further demonstrate the distinctness of the two types of answer we might 
consider the sorts of questions that one might ask when requesting either a global or 
local answer. If we are looking for a local answer, we might ask something like ‘How 
should I live my life in order to attain the most meaning for it in the final analysis?’. If 
we are looking for a global answer, we might ask ‘What is the ultimate purpose and 
explanation for life and existence in general?’. Recalling the social-metaphysical 
distinction, here we can clearly see that local answers are ones which arise from within 
a social framework where the metaphysical nature of reality is not explicitly questioned. 
On the other hand, when we are asking for a global answer, the metaphysical nature of 
reality and therefore the social framework itself  is what is being questioned. If the 
metaphysical nature of reality is ever questioned as a result of local question or answer 
this is only as a by-product of that particular local question or answer – that it is a local 
question or answer does not itself necessitate a metaphysical explanation, because it 
could arguably be the case that the maximal local meaning that one can attain has no 
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relation to the ultimate metaphysical explanation for reality, as local meaning might be 
argued to depend only on subjective or intersubjective agreement, for example. The 
global question of or answer to life’s meaning, however, does necessitate a 
metaphysical explanation.  
The global-metaphysical answer is of a higher order, in that it questions the entire 
foundation from which the social question arises. Considering this, if we were going to 
say that the global and local answers are answering the same question, then we would 
have to also say that any question arising from within our social framework, such as 
moral questions, are of the same kind as metaphysical ones that question this entire 
social framework. 
Tartaglia says the following (2016: 22): 
The [social] framework imposes a mutual understanding; an 
interpretation of the world and the various options we have for living in 
it which facilitates cooperation for the purposes of satisfying our 
imperatives, many of which are suggested – and all of which are shaped 
– by the framework itself. 
He goes on to explain how this social framework is analogous to a “highly flexible and 
complex game” (ibid.: 23), and uses this to distinguish the social framework from life 
itself, in that “if the practice of playing the prescribed roles of the framework, and 
thereby interpreting life as a game were to cease, life would not cease” (ibid.), whereas 
in a game such as chess, if such practice ceased, so would chess itself.  
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This helps bring to light why the metaphysical and social answers are so different. 
Asking for meaning from within the social framework is akin to asking which chess 
piece should go where. Asking for meaning globally and metaphysically, however, is 
akin to asking why the rules of chess are what they are, and asking why anyone should 
bother playing it in the first place. The local question of life’s meaning is located in the 
framework; the global question is about the meaning of the framework itself. 
This also goes some way towards explaining the asymmetry described earlier: that the 
ontological relation can only ever run from the global to the local, and not vice versa. 
Let us continue with our analogy. A local answer in the game of chess might be that one 
should attempt to play in such a manner, through adherence to the rules of the game, 
that you might eventually checkmate your opponent. A global answer, on the other 
hand, might be that the game is created with X, Y and Z rules, by us humans, for 
various purposes such as to have fun, or to test one’s mental skills, or to provide 
opportunity to outwit other opponents. A local answer could answer to the purpose of 
chess by saying that the purpose from within the game is to win it via checkmate, where 
the purpose of and explanation for this purpose is presupposed; to question this purpose 
further would be to request a global answer. The former, local answer, to checkmate 
your opponent, could never in itself guarantee the purpose of the game’s existence, as to 
do so it would need to exit its framework, the existence of which the local answer itself 
is predicated upon. On the other hand, the entire context and purpose of the framework 
itself, and the rules which we devised, might tell us what the purpose of the game is 
internal to its framework. We might say that the local answer, ‘to checkmate your 
opponent’, gives us insight into the purpose of the game’s framework itself, since it 
points towards its nature being competitive (we could even argue that this being the 
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purpose necessitates the competitive nature of the framework), for example, but then 
this would only be an epistemological relation. It could never be the case that the 
answer ‘to checkmate your opponent’ is ontologically prior to the game’s overall 
purpose, its framework of rules included. On the other hand, it is the case that the 
game’s framework is ontologically prior to the game’s purpose to checkmate your 
opponent since you cannot have the latter without the former. 
Where the first, local, answer arises as a response to the question ‘What is the purpose 
of chess?’ from within the framework of the game itself, the second, global answer also 
answers to its purpose, but from outside of the framework. It is clear that these are not 
the same questions at all, for where one is questioning how one should act from within 
the rules of the game, the other is questioning the intelligibility, purpose, and 
significance of the game in its entirety. In other words, whilst they are both answering 
the purpose (or intelligibility or significance) of the game, the object of this question is 
different. In the first case, the object in question is ‘the game from within, already 
presupposing its framework of existence’. In the second case, the object in question is 
‘the game from without, including its framework of existence’. 
So, we see that although at face value both local and global requests for the purpose, 
intelligibility, or significance of the game are the same, upon closer inspection the 
object of questioning is different in each case. The object of the local answer is the 
game with its framework already presupposed, and the object of the global answer is 
the game’s framework itself. When considering the question of life’s meaning, then, we 
can say that a local answer is answering to the meaning of life with its social framework 
already presupposed, and a global answer is answering to the meaning of life in its 
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entirety, including its framework. As such, these are two distinct answers deserving of 
their own distinct questions. The ‘meaning in life’ and ‘meaning of life’ distinction is 
most suitable, since it indicates that the local answer is answering the question from 
within the framework, whereas the global answer is essentially about the meaning of the 
framework and all it contains. Thus, the question ‘What is the meaning of life?’ is 
asking a distinct global question, and the question ‘How may I gain meaning in my 
life?’ is asking a distinct local question. 
So, the question of ‘the meaning of life’, which is the focus of the remainder of this 
thesis, is distinct from the question of ‘meaning in life’. The question of the meaning of 
life is seeking a global, metaphysical answer – but is there anything else to be said 
about it? Importantly, is it just the request for a global and metaphysical answer? 
2.3 Metaphysical narratives 
There is much talk of ‘narrative’ in the literature on life’s meaning (e.g. May, 2015; 
Bres, 2018; Kauppinen, 2012). However, such talk is almost always centred around 
issues of meaning in life, in other words, around how one might make their own life 
narratively meaningful from within the social framework. When narrative is used in this 
context, it is used as a potential means of objectively grounding meaning, as something 
that can be aimed towards by the individual in order to increase the ‘meaning total’ of 
their life. If you attain narrative consistency, or live a life which instantiates a particular 
type of story or narrative ‘texture’, then you have increased the meaning in your life. 
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This is not how Seachris uses narrative. In his paper, ‘The Meaning of Life as 
Narrative: A New Proposal for Interpreting Philosophy’s “Primary” Question’ (2009), 
he argues that the request for the meaning of life is a request for “a narrative that 
narrates across those elements and accompanying questions of life of greatest 
existential import to human beings” (ibid.: 20). This understanding of the question of 
the meaning of life is, I think, correct.  
At this point, it is useful to look at the broader picture, and to remind ourselves of the 
question of the meaning of life, and the circumstances under which it is often posed. 
Although the question may be posed under many circumstances, one preeminent 
circumstance is that of the existential crisis. We may wonder just what our life’s 
purpose has been, how significant it has been, or perhaps just how, or from which 
context, it makes sense. Probably the most well-known description of the existential 
crisis comes autobiographically, from Tolstoy (1882). Here he describes the way in 
which his life became more and more meaningless to him, through more and more 
frequent “moments of perplexity” (ibid.: 380) during which he would question and 
doubt his life’s meaning. Eventually this became his preeminent mood, and his entire 
life was thrown into the jaws of meaninglessness. I quote here at length (ibid.: 381). 
I was absolutely muddled up inside, and did not know what to think. 
When thinking about how best to educate my children, I would ask 
myself: “What for?” Or when thinking about how best to promote the 
welfare of the peasants, I would suddenly say to myself: “But what does 
it matter to me?” And when I thought about the fame that all my literary 
works would bring to me, I would say to myself: “Very well, I will 
become famous. So what? What then?” 
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I could find no answers, but the questions would not wait. They had to 
be answered at once, and if I did not answer them, it was impossible for 
me to live. But no answer was being given. I felt that the ground on 
which I stood was crumbling, that there was nothing for me to stand on, 
that what I had been living from and for was nothing, that I had no solid 
reason for living. 
Notice that Tolstoy questioned his life’s meaning despite having lived a life which 
many would say is meaningful from a context internal to our social framework. So, 
often what is ultimately being questioned in the existential crisis is the framework itself, 
thus the global-metaphysical question of the meaning of life. 
However, Tolstoy also serves as an example of the importance of the answer to life’s 
meaning being for us. His moments of perplexity arose from contemplating just what it 
is that makes his own goals, activities, and relationships meaningful. He questioned his 
two previously held purposes: his family and his writing (ibid.: 382). He tells us, “Once 
I grasped how meaningless and terrible my own life was, the play in the mirror could no 
longer amuse me.” (ibid.). So it is through his own life being thrown into question that 
the play (or framework) of life is also thrown into question. But what does it mean for 
an answer to be ‘for us’? I contend that an answer which is suitably ‘for us’ is one 
which is as Seachris describes, which narrates across various elements of most 
existential import to us. If the answer does not narrate across those things which strike 
us as most important (such as, for example, our relationships to others, or our life’s 
passions, or the role that death plays in our life and its meaning), then it cannot be 
considered a suitable answer to the meaning of life. This is not to say, however, that the 
answer cannot be negative in some of these respects – for example, we could have an 
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answer which says that death, when it comes for each individual, does annihilate the 
meaning in our lives (or we could have one that says that it is entirely unimportant) – it 
just means that the answer must in some way address the issue, either implicitly or 
explicitly.  
So, we may say that the elements and questions of most existential import are those 
which might be posed in an existential crisis. An answer to the meaning of life, in other 
words, must be suitably far-reaching. Seachris tells us that these elements across which 
the meaning of life must narrate should “directly address the cluster of existentially 
relevant facts and accompanying questions that most often surface in the context of 
discussions over the meaning of life” (2009: 14). They are what “motivate us to inquire 
into life’s meaning” (ibid.: 15). He proposes five elements/questions which might fit the 
bill. There is room for discussion and debate around the details, but these give us 
enough of a foothold to continue our discussion. They are the following (ibid.: 14). 
[1] Fact—something exists, we [humans] exist, and I exist / Question—
Why does anything or we or I exist at all? 
[2] Question—Does life have any purpose(s), and if so, what is its nature 
and source? 
[3] Fact—we are often passionately engaged in life pursuits and projects 
that we deem, pre-philosophically, to be valuable and worthwhile / 
Question—Does the worth and value of these pursuits and projects need 
grounding in something else, and if so, what? 
[4] Fact—pain and suffering are a part of the universe / Question—Why? 
[5] Question—How does it all end? Is death final? Is there an 
eschatological remedy to the ills of this world? 
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According to Seachris, these elements are what stand “in need of elucidation, or 
narration” (ibid.: 15). This list is not necessarily exhaustive, and an answer to the 
meaning of life does not necessarily have to narrate across every single one of these 
elements, but it at least goes some way towards demonstrating which sorts of elements 
a global-metaphysical explanation for our existence should affect. These are some of 
those elements and questions of most existential import to human beings. In short, these 
are elements and questions that might be posed in an existential crisis like the one that 
Tolstoy had, revolving around the nature and purpose of our existence and its 
significance. Death, suffering, and the significance of our life pursuits are of existential 
import to us because they question the overall purpose, intelligibility, and significance 
of those elements taken to be most important and in common to all human life. 
Whatever someone chooses to be their own pursuits and projects, the fact of there being 
some such pursuits and projects, and the fact of suffering and death, is common to this 
person as it is to every human being, and it is the intelligibility, purpose, and 
significance of these things that is called into question in the existential crisis. Narrating 
across these common elements is what a meaning of life must do. However, for our 
purposes, and given all that we have come to understand about the question of the 
meaning of life, I think we can take Seachris’s general idea and run with it in a slightly 
different direction. Given our focus upon the preeminent distinction between meaning 
in life and the meaning of life, we might now be tempted to reconsider the relationship 
between the two.  
The meaning of life, we concluded, is a global-metaphysical explanation for life and 
existence in general. Meaning in life is something which can supposedly be attained 
within an individual’s own life to make it more meaningful from within the social 
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framework. However, we now have an addendum to the ‘meaning-of’ formulation, in 
that it must also narrate across those elements and questions of most existential import 
to human beings. At this point one might respond that the ‘meaning-of’ answer must 
also answer to the ‘meaning-in’ formulation, for if it does not do this, the Tolstoys of 
the world are not likely to be satisfied, since they will be unconvinced of how any of 
this explanation pertains to them. Seemingly, then, we have snuck meaning in life in 
through the back door. We might even doubt our clear distinction between the two 
questions. Does this mean that they are, after all of this, the same question? 
The answer to this is no, they are not the same question. We can see this clearly if we 
return to the analogy of chess. The meaning-in question, we discovered, is analogous to 
questioning what the point of chess is from within the game. The answer would be ‘to 
checkmate your opponent’. The meaning-of question is analogous to questioning what 
the point of the existence of the game of chess is, a question of another order. Let us 
assume there is an answer to this second-order question, the meaning of the game – let 
us say that the answer is, for the moment, ‘to better one’s strategic mental faculties’. Let 
us also assume that we decide this answer is not enough, and that it must also tell us 
about the point of the game from within. The answer to this new formulation might be: 
‘The point of the game is to better one’s strategic mental faculties, and to do this you 
must adhere to the rules of the game and try to checkmate your opponent.’ We now 
have a comprehensive answer to this new formulation, which includes the answer to the 
original formulation (the point of the game’s existence) and also the other question, the 
new addendum (the point of the game from within). The other question (the addendum, 
the point of the game from within), we must notice, does not require the second-order 
question (the point of the existence of the game) for it to function on its own, because 
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one could imagine other explanations for the existence of chess that would result in the 
same answer to the point of the game from within; the same local question can be 
asked, and the same answer potentially given, regardless of the answer to the global 
question. Furthermore, we might say that an answer to the meaning of the game is 
something such as, ‘To provide a spectacle for those outside the game.’ In this case, 
there would be no correct way to play the game once we are within the framework, but 
there would be a purpose to our playing the game at all. What this shows us is that we 
might have an answer that answers to the meaning in the game in the negative – it says 
that what we do in the game does not matter – but which nevertheless pertains to the 
meaning in the game. In other words, we might have an answer which narrates across 
the point of the game from within, i.e. which tells us something about the point of the 
game from within, but which tells us that there is no point of the game from within. 
The same is true of the meaning-in/meaning-of distinction. Whilst our new addendum 
to the meaning-of question means it must narrate across those elements of most 
existential import to us, this does not necessitate the inclusion of a positive answer to 
meaning in life; it only necessitates that the answer must pertain to meaning in life. A 
suitable answer could, for instance, be a global-metaphysical explanation which tells us 
that these elements of existential import that pertain to meaning in life (such as our 
relationships, narrative consistency, subjective engagement, etc.) are actually 
unimportant. The answer has still narrated across these elements, but it does not tell us 
that they are relevant or important. That we could have a positive answer to the 
meaning of life that includes a negative answer to meaning in life proves that the 
addendum ‘a meaning of life must pertain to meaning in life’ does not render the two 
questions the same. 
33 
 
We may look at an example to demonstrate the importance of this new addendum to the 
question of the meaning of life. Suppose that someone is asking for the meaning of life. 
Perhaps they are in distress, steeped in existential doubt and crisis; or, perhaps they are 
simply wondering, as we are, from a removed, philosophical standpoint. Either way, 
they ask the question: ‘What is the meaning of life?’. Let us suppose someone replies 
the following: ‘I have recently, through much philosophical reflection, discovered that 
there exists a necessary being, a ‘god’, if you like. This god created all of everything 
that there is, and is himself of such a nature that he could never have not been. This god 
created everything so that the Blorgs, a faraway species of alien life, can reproduce and 
colonise their galaxy, and eventually the universe in its entirety. God created the Blorgs 
because he wanted something to manifest itself in material form as a representation of 
himself – the blorgs are like God. As for our purpose, it is simply to help the Blorgs 
achieve their colonising goal. One day we will encounter a Blorgian diplomat who asks 
for aid, and by this point we must have reached a point in the development of our 
civilisation where we are capable of helping them. Eventually we must allow them to 
exterminate us.’  
In this example, see that we have a global-metaphysical explanation for our existence:  
that a god has created us for the purpose of helping the Blorgs. But does this answer 
narrate across those elements of most existential import to us? Yes, it does. We have 
been told why we exist, and for what purpose; we have been told what we should be 
doing (we should be attempting to get civilisation to a point where we can help the 
Blorgs with their colonisation); and we have been told something about our place and 
importance in the universe. Notice that we have not answered to all of the elements 
from Seachris’ list, but this is okay. First, the list is not something that must be 
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exhaustive – it merely demonstrates the sorts of elements and questions which we wish 
a global-metaphysical explanation to affect. Second, this particular global-metaphysical 
explanation for existence seemingly will, in fact, narrate across these other elements 
which are, on the face of it, left out. For instance, if we were to know more about the 
nature of the god of this explanation, we might discover something about our deaths 
and whether they would be final. And as for whether our deaths affect the meaning of 
life, we have a direct answer to that: they only affect the meaning of life to the extent 
that they might alter the chance of human civilisation reaching a point where it is 
capable of helping the Blorgs. Furthermore, if we knew more about the nature of this 
god and of the reality that he has created, then we would know the nature and purpose 
of suffering (perhaps it is necessary for us to suffer for the Blorgs to achieve their goal). 
The fact that we do not know this explicitly from the global-metaphysical answer does 
not mean that the answer does not, in fact, narrate across this element of existential 
import to us. At most, we can say that we have incomplete knowledge regarding the full 
implications of the global-metaphysical explanation, but this would still be the 
explanation, an answer to the meaning of life, and it would still narrate across these 
elements of most existential import to us. And this explanation would not be cut short, 
either, since it would not stop short of final teleological justification. We would not 
only know the reason for our existence, we would know the reason for the Blorgs’ 
existence, too, which would be the ultimate teleological explanation for life in general. 
Once again we return to an epistemological problem, not an ontological one. A meaning 
of life must be a global-metaphysical answer which narrates across questions and 
elements of most existential import to us, but that does not mean that how the answer 
narrates across these questions and elements will be clear. This is why, for example, 
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there are so many differing interpretations of how we should live our lives even from 
within the same religion (say, Christianity), where each interpretation comes from the 
same global-metaphysical explanation. If we suppose that the Christian God exists, then 
the fact that there might be different interpretations of the correct way to live for God 
does not mean, however, that there is not a single correct way to live for God (or that 
there is, in fact, no correct way). God, as an explanation for existence, would narrate 
across these elements, and whether or not we know how this explanation affects these 
elements, or how we should interpret them, does not matter—it still would affect these 
elements. 
So, we now have it that the meaning of life must be a global-metaphysical explanation 
for existence and the human species which narrates across those elements and questions 
of most existential import to us. We must, however, remember the primacy of the 
global-metaphysical explanation. Because such an explanation would be the ultimate 
foundation for existence, it is logically and ontologically prior to anything we might say 
about other elements and questions of existential import. So, while a global-
metaphysical answer must pertain to such elements and questions, we must remember 
that the global-metaphysical explanation itself is what is primary, and is what allows us 
to answer to these other elements and questions (whether in the positive or negative). 
Importantly, this development of our understanding of the question of the meaning of 
life resonates with something that we discovered in chapter 1: that one way of 
understanding the meaning of something is to understand its “total, resultant meaning” 
(Nozick, 1981: 575). This ‘total’ meaning, we said, describes the meaning of something 
when this explanation encompasses all other types of meaning (see §1.1). Another way 
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to think of total meaning, then, would be as a meaning which narrates across all other 
types of meaning. Considering the meaning of life, we might say that it is a global-
metaphysical explanation for life and existence which narrates across those different 
elements and questions of most existential import to us, and which narrates across those 
elements of different meaning types. So, if we take Seachris’ more broad categories of 
meaning – intelligibility, significance, and purpose (Seachris and Kim, 2018: 2) – we 
can say that the meaning of life, a global-metaphysical explanation for life and 
existence, narrates across those elements of most existential import to us, and in doing 
so narrates across the three different types of meaning. Going back to the god of the 
Blorgs, we can see that such an explanation for the meaning of life would, in fact, 
narrate across not only different elements and questions of existential import, but also 
across different types of meaning. We would understand our purpose, but we would 
also have our place in the universe rendered intelligible, and we would have some idea 
of our significance. 
2.4 The centrality of intelligibility-meaning 
We now have a final definition for ‘the meaning of life’, being an ultimate (global and 
metaphysical) explanation for life and existence which narrates across those elements of 
most existential import to human beings. We have also seen how this is similar to 
Nozick’s notion of total, resultant meaning, whereby it answers to all different relevant 
conceptions of ‘meaning’, and most broadly to purpose-meaning, intelligibility-




By ‘central’ I mean that, given this understanding of the question, intelligibility-
meaning best describes the sort of meaning that we are looking for when we ask for a 
meaning of life. But this is not to say that significance-meaning and purpose-meaning 
are not present in our understanding – in fact, they are very important, they just play 
less of a central role in unifying different elements of the question than intelligibility-
meaning. Remember, we are not operating under a definition of the meaning of life 
which sees it as a cluster of disjointed requests (the pluralist position), rather we are 
operating under a definition which unifies various interrelated requests and elements 
under the umbrella of one term, treating it as a single meaningful question (the monist 
position). Intelligibility-meaning, I argue, plays a central role in this unification. 
In the previous section we looked at some examples of the sorts of elements or requests 
which are of most existential import to human beings, and are what an answer to the 
meaning of life must narrate across. Under this definition we maintain that the global-
metaphysical answer is foundational to all other related elements, but we also leave 
room for this global-metaphysical answer to narrate across these other important 
elements.  
The problem, however, is that we cannot so clearly say that every element is one of 
purpose-meaning or of significance-meaning, although these elements may have certain 
implications on our views regarding each of these things. This is why the ‘total, 
resultant meaning’ conception which Nozick provides is so useful: because it allows us 
to narrate not just across different elements of existential import, but also across 
different types of elements of existential import. It allows us to narrate across elements 
of type intelligibility-meaning, significance-meaning, and purpose-meaning. Under total 
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meaning, we are allowed to narrate across all of these types of meaning and to unify 
different elements of existential import. But what does this process of unification look 
like?  
Intelligibility-meaning regarding the meaning of life, Seachris tells us, is a way to 
“make sense of life, especially its existentially weighty aspects” (2018: 3). What better 
way to make sense of life than to have an answer to life’s meaning which narrates 
across all these existentially weighty elements? Such a meaning would, as discussed in 
the previous section, have the global-metaphysical explanation of existence as its 
foundation, and the other elements of existential import would follow from this, but it is 
through the intelligibility of such a unification of these elements under one explanation 
that we find our answer to the question. 
Let us look at a common answer to the meaning of life. Let us assume for the moment 
that there is a god and that god’s purpose is what bestows our lives with meaning. The 
global-metaphysical foundation for this answer would be the existence of god and the 
ultimate nature of the reality that god has created. From this explanation, other elements 
of existential import and different types of meaning would be narrated across. We 
would have an answer to our purpose, since it would be whatever god made us for. That 
is purpose-meaning covered. We would have an answer to why anything exists at all, 
since god, as a necessary being, would be immune to any arguments of regress. That is 
intelligibility-meaning covered. And we would also have an answer to whether or not, 
and in what way, we are significant, since we would be as significant as god deemed us 
to be. That is significance-meaning covered. We would also have answers to other 
elements and requests of existential import, such as the value and purpose of suffering, 
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and life after death. All of these elements are answered as a direct result of this global-
metaphysical answer to the meaning of life. 
However, all the while running parallel to this naturally expanding answer to the 
meaning of life is the fact that what is happening through the unification of these 
elements into one single answer is the rendering intelligible of life and existence, 
insofar as the intelligibility of life and existence is the understanding of how all these 
elements of existential import fit together. Overarching all unified elements of which 
we want a unified answer to, then, is the umbrella of intelligibility-meaning. As one 
commentator puts it: “We are trying to find the order in the drama of Time.” (Wisdom, 
1965). While we cannot simply leave it at that – we must specify what might constitute 
sufficient ‘order’, and also how such order arises in the first place through a global-
metaphysical explanation – the point remains that any explanation which brings 
together and unifies various interrelated elements of existential import is essentially 
undertaking a process of intelligibility-rendering. As such, intelligibility-meaning plays 
a central role in the process of unification and therefore in the answer to the question of 







3 The legitimacy of the question 
I have presented different interpretations of the phrase ‘the meaning of life,’ and, after 
forming a broad topology which classifies such answers, I have presented my reasons 
for holding primarily to a distinction between ‘the meaning of life’ and ‘meaning in 
life.’ The former, an ultimate meaning which narrates across various elements of the 
most existential import to human beings, is the focus of this thesis. The question of the 
meaning of life, given this understanding of the phrase, and given the embedded 
requirement for an ultimate and final purpose, is not without its criticisms, and there are 
those who would ardently deny its coherence and who would say that the question itself 
is, in fact, meaningless. To some, this fact is seen as something which might deflate the 
problem of life’s meaning in its entirety: if there is no question, then there is no 
problem to be resolved.  
Scepticism regarding the question of the meaning of life may be seen as arising from 
the context of a positivism which denied any possibility for meaningful metaphysical 
speculation. With Ayer as the movement’s spearhead, at least in the UK, and with 
others following suit, “the thesis that the meaning of a proposition was its mode of its 
verification, the verification principle, was the great weapon in the attack on 
metaphysics.” (Kenny, 2010: 799). For the most part the positivists ignored the question 
of life’s meaning, content to imply that it was meaningless – Ayer was the exception 
rather than the rule in giving the question his attention. Wittgenstein, despite having a 
large influence on the movement, was more of an interested bystander than an active 
participant in positivism. He thought that the question of life’s meaning was 
meaningful, but nonetheless hoped that he might one day be able to stop asking it; thus, 
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in the Tractatus he tells us, “The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing 
of the problem.” (1922: 6.521). Once we re-engage with life the problem of its meaning 
disappears – we have found our solution.  
As for the strictly positivist critique, as we have seen, there is a close connection 
between the question of the meaning of life and the issues of metaphysics, so it is not 
difficult to see how such positivist scepticism arises. If all metaphysical talk is 
meaningless because it is neither tautological nor empirically verifiable (Ayer, 1936: 
16) then the question of the meaning of life must be meaningless too, since it is 
metaphysical in nature. Any talk about ‘ultimate meaning’ is gibberish, since such a 
thing would lie outside the bounds of verifiability. 
Ayer, in his The Claims of Philosophy (1947), provides a more specific argument than 
this. He argues that the question of life’s meaning makes no sense because any meaning 
must be something which we choose, and so it makes no sense to ask for a meaning of 
life which must, presumably, describe an ultimate purpose or goal which is given to us. 
If it is not chosen by us then it cannot ever be a justification for existence, it can only be 
an explanation – it would answer the how, but not the why, of existence. This line of 
thought is found in others such as Nielsen (1964). 
A second argument regarding the legitimacy of the question comes from Edwards 
(1972). The argument is as follows. For any given answer to the question of the 
meaning of life, we will always reject it as not going back far enough. Furthermore, for 
something to explain everything in its entirety (as a meaning of life must), it would 
have to be something that exists outside of everything, which is logically contradictory. 
43 
 
Given this, it is logically impossible to answer the question of life’s meaning, and the 
question is rendered meaningless.  
These arguments are the strongest direct attacks on the legitimacy of the question of the 
meaning of life that I have found, both in terms of their philosophical rigour and in their 
decidedly anti-metaphysical angle, and they are also anecdotally two of the most 
commonly espoused ones (should opposition to the legitimacy of the question be 
espoused at all). I outline both of these arguments and demonstrate why they fail, 
leaving the question of the meaning of life, understood as an ultimate meaning which 
narrates across various elements of existential import, intact as a meaningful question 
which may or may not be answerable. Ayer, and his particular brand of positivism, held 
strong influence in the 20th century, and the positivist critique of metaphysics left a stain 
on issues surrounding life’s meaning, rendering much of the literature focused solely on 
meaning in life. In tackling these arguments I hope to go some way towards removing 
that stain. 
3.1 Must meaning be chosen? 
Ayer, in The Claims of Philosophy (1947), argues that the question of the meaning of 
life, interpreted as a “certain specifiable end” towards which all events are tending 
(ibid.: 199), is not a meaningful question. Such a question is senseless, just as we might 
say the questions ‘what is north of the north pole?’ and ‘is two blue?’ are senseless. He 
claims that the problem with the meaning of life question is that such a meaning would 
only explain existence, not justify it, because, “from the point of view of justifying 
one’s existence, there is no essential difference between a teleological explanation of 
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events and a mechanical explanation” (ibid.). An end towards which all events are 
tending would answer the how but not the why of existence, and those who seek the 
answer to the meaning of life are seeking something which answers the why rather than 
the how. Messerly tells us that, for Ayer, “even if there were such an end it would do us 
no good in our quest for meaning because the end would only explain existence (it is 
heading towards some end) not justify existence (it should move towards that end).” 
(2012: 65). Furthermore, the question does not account for the fact that any meaning of 
life would have to be something which we ourselves choose. It is for this reason that 
Ayer says God is not a suitable answer to the question, since such a purpose as one 
which God gives us would not be our own and would not provide justification for 
existence, merely an explanation (ibid.: 200). Because of this, Ayer says that the 
question of the meaning of life is “so framed as to be unanswerable”, and that “there is 
no sense in asking what is the ultimate purpose of our existence, or what is the real 
meaning of life.” (ibid.: 201). 
One initial objection to Ayer’s diagnosis, which follows from Part 1’s exploration of 
what it means to ask for the meaning of life, would be to say that his prescription for 
what the question means is too limited or narrow. I have outlined my reasons for 
holding to a conception of the meaning of life which narrates across more elements than 
merely a ‘purpose’ or a ‘certain specifiable end towards which all things are tending’, 
and if this conception holds then Ayer’s diagnosis of senselessness is misguided, since 
it is diagnosed upon the back of the assumption that asking for the meaning of life is 
asking only for a purpose. However, I believe that Ayer’s diagnosis does not stand even 
if we grant his understanding of the question as merely a request for a purpose; 
furthermore, it may plausibly be argued that even under a broader conception of the 
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meaning of life, the purpose of existence is foundational for all other elements of 
existential import. As such, I provisionally take Ayer’s understanding of the question as 
correct, and respond to the argument on its own terms. 
The first thing to consider is Ayer’s claim that a meaning of life would only explain 
existence, not justify it – in other words, that it would explain the how but not the why 
of existence. Let us look at this distinction between how and why. Edwards, in his 
paper, “Why” (1972), describes the alleged contrast between how and why questions. 
We will be dealing with Edwards’ own argument regarding the legitimacy of the 
question in the next section, but for now we will simply make use of his analysis of 
how- and why-questions. 
Why-questions, he points out, are seen by some as being beyond the remit of science 
(which merely answers the how), whilst metaphysics (or religion) may purport to ask 
these why-questions. Such an understanding, he tells us, is used by metaphysicians and 
the religious in order to distinguish these areas from that of science; but it is also used 
by those who oppose metaphysics and religion, who say that while science cannot 
answer why-questions, religion or metaphysics cannot either. Edwards reminds us that 
this understanding is too simplistic, and that there is not such a clear boundary between 
how-questions and why-questions. 
We are reminded first that ‘how’ and ‘why’ may sometimes be used interchangeably 
(ibid.: 31). For example, we might plausibly ask, ‘How does ibuprofen alleviate the 
symptoms of a headache?’ just as plausibly as we might ask, ‘Why does ibuprofen 
alleviate the symptoms of a headache?’. Such questions are most often ones which are 
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looking for a cause. He then goes on to say that how-questions and why-questions are 
sometimes different and non-interchangeable. We are told that “this contrast is most 
obvious when we deal with intentional, or more generally with “meaningful,” human 
actions.” (ibid.). For example, asking, ‘Why did you grab that can of Pepsi from the 
fridge?’ is different to asking, ‘How did you grab that can of Pepsi from the fridge?’. 
Here is one way in which why-questions may differ from how-questions: the former 
may be requests for intent or purpose. Finally, we are reminded that a how-question 
might be a request for a state or condition, where a why-question is not. For example, 
one might ask, ‘How hot is it in here?’, which would not be a request for a cause.  
Let us get back to Ayer. Ayer’s claim is that a meaning of life, described as a “certain 
specifiable end” (1947: 199) would not provide justification for existence, as it would 
explain the how but not the why of existence. We now have a rudimentary framework, 
provided by Edwards, with which we may analyse such a claim. Let us explore the rest 
of Ayer’s argument, because both claims – that one, a meaning of life would answer the 
how but not the why of existence, and two, a meaning of life must be chosen by us – act 
in tandem. 
Ayer claims that a meaning of life must be something which we ourselves choose, 
otherwise it would not be our own purpose. He says, regarding the possibility that 
reality is arranged to meet a certain end, that “the end in question will not be one that 
they themselves have chosen. As far as they are concerned it will be entirely arbitrary” 
(ibid.). Such an arbitrary end would be without justification. Presumably, then, the point 
is that only we are givers of justification. While we might be told the end towards 
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which all things are tending, i.e. the meaning of life, this is not a reason or a 
justification, as we are the only ones that could provide such a thing.  
We may rightly question Ayer’s assumption that we are the sole givers of justification. 
For example, could not a god provide justification and reason for the end towards which 
all things are tending? Ayer’s response to the god hypothesis, apart from the claim that 
there is no reason to believe that such a god exists, ultimately amounts to no more than 
a reiteration of his original claim: that the end would not be our end unless it was 
chosen by us. If our purpose is given to us by a god, then that does not justify such a 
purpose. We may still reasonably ask: ‘Why should we follow god’s purpose?’. If we 
say that we could not question god’s purpose due to its sovereignty, then it would be the 
case that we are always conforming to the purpose regardless of what we choose to do, 
anyway. Ayer tells us that, “if [god’s purpose] is sovereign, that is, if everything that 
happens is necessarily in accordance with it, then this is true also of our behaviour. 
Consequently, there is no point in our deciding to conform to it, for the simple reason 
that we cannot do otherwise.” (ibid.: 200). If this is not the case, however, and god’s 
purpose is something which we can choose to conform to, then, for Ayer, “the question 
“Why?” remains unanswered” since it would merely be “pushing the level of 
explanation to a further stage” (ibid.).  We can always request further justification for 
any given level of explanation for existence. The question of justification is only 
something which we may answer ourselves. So, even a god would only answer the how, 
but not the why, since only we can answer the why.  
The problem with this line of argument is clear: he has given no good reason to support 
the claim that we are the sole givers of justification. His reason amounts to a reiteration 
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of the same claim: that we are the sole givers of justification and that we must therefore 
choose our own purposes in order to obtain justification. He does attempt to show how 
an external purpose, such as from god, would not actually provide justification, by 
saying that any such purpose is open to questioning – we may always ask, ‘Why should 
I adhere to this purpose?’. However, in doing so he only begs the question: Why could a 
god not provide this justification? In other words, why would we be right to question 
god’s purpose? In order for us to question god’s purpose, we would have to already be 
labouring under the assumption that we are the sole givers of justification. If there were 
a god, and if this god had given us purpose, then we would have ultimate justification, 
that is, justification which cannot be questioned. If there were a god, constituted of 
necessity and perfection as traditionally conceived, then we would not, in fact, be the 
sole givers of justification. The purpose that god has given us would be ours, and we 
would simply be incorrect to think ourselves tall enough to begin to arbitrate on such 
matters. 
Another counter to Ayer’s claim is put forward by Tartaglia. He tells us that “it would 
not make enough initial sense, prior to Ayer’s diagnosis of senselessness, for somebody 
to ask the question of the meaning of life, if in doing so they were presupposing, as the 
diagnosis demands, that any suitable answer must be one which they themselves 
choose.” (2018: 241). If we must choose our own answer, why would we ever ask the 
question? Of course, Ayer’s point stands if we prescribe that the answer must be one 
which we choose, for then we could simply say that the person asking for the meaning 
of life is confused and asking for the impossible. But, as we have seen, there is no good 
reason to grant this prescription, and the lack of prescription fits in better with the fact 
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that so many people do ask and search for such a given purpose beyond their own 
provincial scopes of choice. 
Returning to the ‘how’ and ‘why’, we may look at Ayer’s argument under the 
framework that Edwards has given us. Recall that Edwards says one primary way in 
which how-questions and why-questions may be different (when they are different at 
all) is that why-questions may ask for an intent or purpose where how-questions do not. 
It seems, however, as if Ayer is attempting to provide one further way in which the two 
types of question may differ: why-questions might also be requests for justification, 
whereas how-questions never are. Since Ayer’s argument assumes that the why of 
existence would provide justification, we have an alignment in Ayer’s thought between 
the why-question and justification. But he also interprets a purpose (or intent) as being 
aligned with the how-question, since he thinks that a purpose for existence would 
answer the how but not the why of existence. So, for Ayer, on the one side we have the 
how-question and purpose, and on the other side we have the why-question and 
justification. 
There is a clear separation, then, between purpose and justification in Ayer’s thought. 
Notice the difference between Ayer and Edwards, here: Ayer sees purpose as being 
under the remit of the how-question, whereas Edwards sees it as being under the why-
question. With Edwards and Ayer we have, if not a difference in thought, then at least 
another potential way of distinguishing the how-question and the why-question: through 
the notion of justification. For Ayer there is a clear distinction between justification and 
purpose or intent, which allows him to claim that a meaning (i.e. purpose, intent) of life 
is not a justification for it. Of course, there may be overlap between purpose and 
50 
 
justification, but that all depends on what one considers suitable criteria for 
justification. 
Let us consider this position. It does not at first seem so easy to separate justification 
from intent and purpose. If I grab a can of Pepsi from the fridge, what is the 
justification for such an action? If somebody asks why I grabbed the can, and if they are 
asking for a justification of my action, then my answer might not be any different from 
the one I provide to answer the intent formulation: ‘I felt thirsty and wanted a can of 
Pepsi’. The response justifies my action, and reveals its intent. But the question then is: 
Why is my own intent considered proper justification? Could not somebody plausibly 
turn around and say, ‘You wanting that Pepsi does not justify you taking it. It wasn’t 
yours to take. It was someone else’s Pepsi.’? What is considered ‘justification’ in this 
scenario is different to me than it is to the questioner. 
However, even if this is the case, then Ayer’s alignment of the why-question with 
justification, and his distinguishing between purpose and justification, must be 
predicated upon an account of what could count as justification. He has already said 
that a purpose does not provide justification; so what does? He must have something 
already in mind with which to judge an answer by. It turns out that he does: what counts 
as justification for existence is just that it is something which we ourselves choose. A 
meaning of life cannot justify existence since it is not something which we ourselves 
choose. But then we are begging the question, since it is the assumption that a justified 
purpose can only be something that we choose that enables him to say that a meaning of 
life cannot justify and answer the why of existence. That we are the sole givers of 
justification is a foundational assumption for his argument that a meaning of life would 
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answer the how but not the why of existence, and there is no convincing reason 
provided for accepting this assumption. If we reject this assumption then we have no 
reason to assume that a meaning of life would not answer to the why of existence, since 
justification would be able to be given to us externally (by a god, for example). Since 
we have no reason to assume that we are the sole givers of justification, we have no 
reason to accept that a meaning of life could not answer the why of existence, and we 
have no reason to assume that a meaning of life could not justify existence. Once this 
assumption is dismissed, Ayer’s diagnosis of the question as senseless disappears, and 
we again accept the possibility of a meaningful answer. 
3.2 The end of regress 
Edwards, in his paper “Why” (1972), provides a different argument against the meaning 
of life question. He argues that an ultimate explanation for everything is impossible, 
since such an explanation would have to posit the existence of something outside of 
everything in order to explain everything. Because there cannot be something outside of 
everything, since that something would be part of everything and hence not outside of 
it, the question is asking for something which is logically impossible, and is therefore 
meaningless. So, it is the logical impossibility of an answer which renders the question 
meaningless, because, as one commentator puts it, “if a question really cannot be 
answered, and if all possible answers have been ruled out a priori, is that not the very 
definition of a meaningless question?” (Messerly, 2012: 63). 
After looking at the how-question and why-question in general, Edwards goes on to 
distinguish two types of why-question: the ‘theological why’ and the ‘super-ultimate 
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why’. His argument proceeds by distinguishing these two types of why-question and 
then demonstrating why an answer to the super-ultimate why is impossible.  
The theological why, Edwards tells us, is a type of ‘cosmic’ why-question for which 
“the questioner would be satisfied with a theological answer if he found such an answer 
convincing in its own right. He may or may not accept it as true, but would not regard it 
as irrelevant.” (1972: 33). So, the theological ‘why’ is a cosmic question which is posed 
under the starting assumption that a theological answer would satisfy the criteria for an 
answer. In other words, it is a cosmic question for which God may be the answer. 
The super-ultimate why, on the other hand, is a cosmic why-question for which the 
questioner “would regard the theological answer as quite unsatisfactory, not (or not 
just) because it is meaningless or false but because it does not answer his question.” 
(ibid.: 35). In other words, it is defined in the opposite way to the theological why: it is 
a cosmic question which is posed under the starting assumption that a theological 
answer would not satisfy the criteria for an answer. In such cases, the theological 
answer is denied because “it does not go far enough” (ibid.), because we may still 
question any theological answer. Note the similarity to Ayer. Ayer said that god’s 
purpose cannot answer the meaning of life since we can always ask why we should 
follow this purpose. In this way we can say that, for Edwards, Ayer thinks the question 
of the meaning of life is a super-ultimate why as opposed to a theological why, since he 
is labouring under the assumption that god’s purpose would not be a satisfactory answer 
to this cosmic why-question. The super-ultimate why, in order to ‘go far enough’, 




The distinction that Edwards draws between the ‘theological why’ and the ‘super-
ultimate why’, boils down to one thing, then: whether or not you think a theological 
explanation would answer the particular cosmic why-question that you are asking. If it 
would, then you are asking a ‘theological why’. If it would not, you are asking the 
‘super-ultimate why’. But if you are asking the ‘super-ultimate why’, Edwards says, 
then you are asking for the impossible. 
Edwards claims that the super-ultimate why is incoherent because it can never be 
answered. Any answer to the super-ultimate why, he remarks, will be rejected by the 
questioner as “not going back far enough” (ibid.: 36). For any given explanation, we 
may still question, ‘Why that explanation?’ If god created the world, why did god exist 
in the first place? Wisdom (2018: 193) tells a story to demonstrate this problem: 
There is an old story which runs something like this: A child asked an 
old man “What holds up the world? What holds up all things?” The old 
man answered “A giant.” The child asked “And what holds up the giant? 
You must tell me what holds up the giant.” The old man answered “An 
elephant.” The child said, “And what holds up the elephant?” The old 
man answered “A tortoise.” The child said “You still have not told me 
what holds up all things. For what holds up the tortoise?” The old man 
answered “Run away and don’t ask me so many questions.” 
The problem, then, occurs when you reach the level of the super-ultimate why and ask: 
What holds up all things? The super-ultimate why-question might be phrased, “Why 
does the universe exist?”, where “the “universe” is taken to include everything that in 
fact exists” (Edwards, 1972: 38). When we ask for an explanation of x, however, we are 
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asking for “something or some set of conditions, other than x, in terms of which it can 
be explained” (ibid.). The problem, therefore, is that in asking the super-ultimate why-
question we are asking for something or some set of conditions other than, or outside 
of, the totality of all things. This is clearly contradictory, since there can be nothing 
outside of everything, otherwise the latter would not be everything. 
Wisdom has his own response to this line of argument through the analogy of a play 
(2018: 194-6). He tells us that “sometimes even when we have seen and heard a play 
from the beginning to the end we are still puzzled and still ask what does the whole 
thing mean” because we wish to “grasp the character, the significance of the whole 
play.” (ibid.: 194-5). Regarding the meaning of life, this analogy can be used to 
illuminate the fact that our request is to “find the order in the drama of Time.” (ibid.: 
195). As such, we are not requesting  something outside of everything which would 
explain everything, we are merely looking for a way of understanding everything as it 
already is, has been, and will be. And this, for Wisdom, defeats the sceptical position 
because it allows for the question to be meaningful, just like the question ‘what did that 
play mean?’ would be a meaningful question even if we had seen the entire play and 
knew its surrounding context. The request for life’s meaning, then, is not a request for 
something outside of everything which would explain everything, it is a request for how 
we might understand this everything. 
Referring back to chapter 1, we can see that Wisdom’s rejoinder amounts to saying that 
the meaning of life is primarily a request for “intelligibility-meaning” (Seachris and 
Kim, 2018: 2). However, I have already argued that intelligibility-meaning alone is 
insufficient, given the nature of the request as one which narrates across multiple 
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elements of existential import to us. While intelligibility-meaning is central to the 
meaning of life (as argued in 2.4), it cannot exist on its own since this centrality occurs 
through the rendering intelligible of our purpose and significance. This is what makes 
intelligibility-meaning central: that it is through the ‘intelligibility rendering’ of  life 
and existence that a meaning of life would be coherent – but if there were no answer to 
our purpose or significance there would not be a complete picture for which to render 
intelligible. In other words, intelligibility-meaning needs something to make intelligible. 
Furthermore, in order to fully understand something and render it intelligible, we must 
understand from what context this thing came about. Going back to the analogy of a 
play, we might say that in order for the play to be rendered completely intelligible we 
would need to understand the context from which it arose. Similarly, in order for 
existence to be rendered completely intelligible, we would need to understand the 
context from which existence arose. It is not enough that existence simply is, in the 
same way that it is not enough that a play simply is. After all, when we watch a play we 
already know that the actors and actresses have, before the play commences, come 
together to perform for us on the directions of a playwright who has constructed the 
play in order to convey something to the audience. If the play is taken as analogous to 
‘everything’, then it is only through there being something outside of this ‘everything’ 
that it is able to be rendered intelligible in the first place. Without this outside context, 
its intelligibility would be thrown into question, and we would not have the complete 
picture. Wisdom’s reply, therefore, misses the mark. 
The solution to Edwards’ argument, however, is much simpler than this, and is 
essentially the same as our response to Ayer’s discussion of God. In order to resolve the 
question of how there can be something outside of everything from which to explain 
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everything, we may simply say that there could exist something of necessary existence, 
such as a god. If this is the case then the question ‘how can there be something outside 
of everything from which to explain everything?’ is dissolved, since there does not need 
to be something outside of everything from which to explain everything. If we say that 
a god exists, then we have an answer which is resistant to us stepping back and 
questioning further. The super-ultimate why would be answered, and anyone who 
questioned ‘but what is outside of God that explains his existence’ would simply be 
incorrect to assume that such a question makes sense, for by God’s very nature there 
could be nothing further to explain God. Then, of course, Edwards might reply that this 
would be an answer to the theological-why and not the super-ultimate why. This 
response, however, would miss the point, since if there were a necessary being the 
theological why-question and super-ultimate why-question would coincide. 
Why should we say that these are two separate questions? If we provisionally concretise 
the notion of a ‘cosmic’ why-question, and say, with Ayer, that we are asking for an 
end towards which all events are tending (i.e. an ultimate purpose), then Edwards would 
have to say the following. He would have to say: ‘If you are asking for such an ultimate 
end, then you could either be asking a “theological why” or a “super-ultimate why”. If 
you think that God would be a satisfactory answer, should one exist, then you are 
asking the former. If you don’t, then you are asking the latter’. The problem with this is 
that by defining the super-ultimate why in terms of its relationship to the theological-
why (and vice versa) we are not told anything substantive about what each question is 
really asking. Each question is defined in relation to the other, so there is an inherent 
circularity to the distinction between the theological-why and the super-ultimate why. It 
would be a bit like answering ‘What is an egg and what is an apple?’ with, ‘An egg is 
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not an apple, and an apple is not an egg’. Edwards is operating under a prescription that 
we have no good reason to accept: that the theological-why is different to the super-
ultimate why. The only reason to assume these questions are actually different is if you 
have already presupposed that a theological-why could not answer a super-ultimate 
why. But the only reason to presuppose that would be if you were already presupposing 
that they are different questions.  
The problem with Edwards’ argument, like Ayer’s, is one of a question-begging 
presupposition. With Ayer, the presupposition was that we are the sole givers of 
justification, and the reason for this presupposition amounted to saying that we must 
choose our own purpose(s), which relies upon the presupposition that we are the sole 
givers of justification. With Edwards, the presupposition is that the theological-why is 
different to the super-ultimate why, and the reason for this presupposition amounts to 
saying that the theological-why would not answer the super-ultimate why, which relies 
upon the presupposition that the theological-why is different to the super-ultimate why.  
But if there were a necessary being then the two questions would coincide, and there 
would be no difference between the theological-why and the super-ultimate why. 
Once we do away with this question begging argument, and thereby do away with the 
prescription that a theological answer could not answer the super-ultimate why, we 
have no reason to assume a god could not satisfactorily answer the question of the 
meaning of life, should one exist. If a god existed, then the question ‘what exists outside 
of everything (including god) which explains everything?’ would be a question with a 
false presupposition, since god would explain everything without needing to exist 
outside of everything. Once we understand this, we realise that the theological why and 
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the super-ultimate why need not be separate questions, rather they are both asking the 
same super-ultimate why-question, and the only relevant question from there is whether 
or not a god could be a sufficient answer to this question. Should one claim that god 
would not sufficiently answer the question, then that does not mean there is an entirely 
different question being asked, it merely means that the questioner holds to a different 
account of what could sufficiently answer the same question. And if this is the case, as I 
have argued it is, then the question of the meaning of life itself is meaningful, and there 
is simply room for discussion about what might constitute a sufficient answer.  
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4 An inaccessible reality 
So far, we have explored different possible interpretations of the question of life’s 
meaning, and following this we have explored different types of answer to the question. 
From the various distinctions provided we distilled a primary one between the local 
question of ‘meaning in life’, which asks ‘How may I accrue more meaning in my own 
life?’ and the global question which asks ‘What is the meaning of life in general?’, 
requesting a global-metaphysical answer for life and existence which narrates across 
those elements and questions of most existential import to human beings. Then, we 
looked at two of the strongest arguments supporting the claim that the question itself is 
meaningless, and discovered that these arguments were premised upon claims which 
begged the question. We concluded that an answer to the question of life’s meaning 
such as that of a god, should one exist, would be a sufficient answer, and therefore that 
the question is a meaningful one. 
There is, however, another way in which the question is sometimes attacked. It is 
sometimes argued that, although there could be an answer to the question of the 
meaning of life, such an answer is not epistemically obtainable for us, and therefore the 
question is, if not meaningless, then redundant because an answer is in principle 
inaccessible and unknowable. In this chapter I outline and present the doctrine of 
transcendental idealism which underpins such epistemic arguments against the 
legitimacy of the question of the meaning of life. This chapter therefore serves only an 
explanatory purpose, so that in the following chapters we may more clearly assess the
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both analytic and continental philosophy in the 20th Century took this basic Kantian idea as their 
starting point. This is seen most notably in the philosophy of language, and in phenomenology, 
respectively. More on this in 4.2. 
repercussions of transcendental idealism and whether, if correct, it would pose a threat 
to the epistemic obtainability of a meaning of life. 
4.1 Transcendental idealism 
The focus of this chapter is what is sometimes called ‘critical’ or ‘post-critical’ – or, 
similarly, ‘Kantian’ or ‘post-Kantian’ – thought. This essentially refers to any strand of 
thought which takes Kant’s critical arguments regarding the transcendentally ideal 
nature of our reality seriously, if not in all its finer nuances then simply at the most 
general level. The critical idea is that all we can ever have knowledge of is the relation 
between thought and being, and not being itself. In other words, the world as it truly is, 
independent of our perception, is inaccessible1. For our purposes, the general critical 
idea, that we only have access to the relation between thought and being, will suffice. 
Nevertheless, it will be useful to sketch at least a partial outline of the framework from 
which such an idea arose, namely the doctrine of transcendental idealism outlined by 
Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787). Emphasis will be placed upon those 
aspects which are most relevant to the meaning of life, primarily those which tell us that 
the world independent of our representation is, in principle, forever beyond our grasp. 
Starting with Kant’s own words, then, transcendental idealism is “the doctrine that 
appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in 
themselves” (ibid.: A369). Under this view, it is not (or not only), as goes the pre-
critical view, that our knowledge conforms to objects in the world, rather it is the 
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reverse, that “objects must conform to our knowledge” (ibid., Bxvi). The only way that 
objects can be possible for us, Kant says, is if these objects conform to our way of 
knowing – they must be constituted not of their own accord but by us. To deny this is to 
claim that we have direct access to the world in itself, independent of our 
representational capacities (it would, in a sense, be becoming god). But this is 
impossible, says Kant, because in order to claim this we would have to step outside our 
own skins and explain the relationship between reality and our capacity for 
representation, which is impossible. As such, the direct external realist cannot account 
for how objects are possible for us. If we flip the equation, however, and say that it is 
objects which must conform to our knowledge, then we have first-person access to 
some fundamental facts about objects, since these objects could not be any other way, 
given our representational capacities. We have a means of explaining how objects are 
possible for us without having to step outside our own skins. 
The best entry-point into this line of thought is through considering just what it is that 
we know must be true. Contrary to Descartes, Kant thinks that the primary truth of our 
own existence as an “I” implies more than we might think. Contained within the idea of 
a thought, recognises Kant, is the notion of a subject. He realises that the subject also 
has an apprehension of its own unity, and in such first-person perception there is no 
distinction between being and seeming. Kant calls this first-personal unity of the self 
the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’. This condition “precedes all experience” and 
“makes experience itself possible” (ibid.: A107). It is a “pure original unchangeable 
consciousness” (ibid.) which acts as a precondition of all self-knowledge. This unity of 
the self “is not the conclusion of any inquiry, but the presupposition of all inquiries.” 
(Scruton, 2014: 72). The crucial step for transcendental idealism is to realise that this
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unified self presupposes objecthood, since self-knowledge is only possible when the 
self has an objective identity, existing through time, which could be other than it 
seems1. 
Objectivity for Kant, therefore, is a precondition of experience, and is something which 
cannot be doubted. From this point Kant develops an account of objectivity which 
describes the necessary preconditions of our experience of objects – in other words, our 
representational capacities to which objects must conform. Although there are more, the 
two primary forms which act as the preconditions of objects are those of space and 
time. In the Aesthetic (ibid.: A19-50/B34-74) Kant develops his account of space and 
time, which argues that rather than being aspects of reality in itself, these are forms of 
sensibility which are preconditions of our experience of reality. In other words, they are 
‘in us’ rather than ‘out there’, because they are what is necessary for us to order our 
experience. 
Kant presents six arguments for space and time being forms of sensibility inherent 
within us. The two most persuasive (and general) of these arguments are as follows. 
First, Kant says that in order for me to refer to an object apart from myself, the concept 
of space must be presupposed, and not empirically derived (since the notion of 
separation itself presupposes space). Second, he says that if space were not presupposed  
a priori, then it would be possible to represent the absence of space. Since this is not 
possible, because we cannot represent objects without space, space must be a condition 
of the possibility of representing objects. (He provides parallel arguments for time as 
well as space.) Space and time are therefore a priori forms which are the sensible
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preconditions of objects. They are within us, as they must be for us to experience 
objects at all. 
So, we now have a picture of reality which tells us that objects must conform to our 
way of knowing. The traditional way of looking at reality is flipped on its head, and 
from this we understand that nothing can be known about reality as it is in itself, 
independent of our representation. All that we have epistemic access to is mere 
representation, and true reality is forever out of bounds. In order to access reality as it is 
in itself, we must be able to transcend our representation of this reality, which is 
impossible. 
Key to understanding transcendental idealism is understanding how it differs from 
transcendental realism. One common confusion is to think of transcendental idealism as 
similar to, for example, Berkeleyan idealism. Berkeley believed that objects are nothing 
more than collections of ideas, and that the world is mind-dependent. This, however, is 
a form of empirical idealism, not transcendental idealism. When it comes to the 
transcendental, even empirical idealists like Berkeley are realists—they are 
transcendental realists. This is because they assume that we can have direct access to, 
or knowledge of, reality as it is in itself. For empirical idealists like Berkeley, this 
means access to a mind-dependent reality, and for empirical realists this means access 
to a mind-independent reality. In both cases the fact remains that their picture of reality 
is one in which we can have access to the world in itself. Transcendental idealism, 
however, denies this. It says that the world as it is in itself can never be known or 
accessed, since to do so would be to transcend our representation of this world. It is 
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impossible to access the world without representing it, and so it is impossible to access 
the world in itself. 
To further support this doctrine Kant also gives us the arguments of the Antinomies. 
These arguments, in short, are intended to demonstrate the logical impossibilities that 
arise if we do not presuppose transcendental idealism. They show us what happens 
when we assume that we can extend our reason beyond phenomena (the world as we 
represent it) and apply it to the noumena (the world as it is in itself when considered as 
thinkable), both from empiricist and rationalist standpoints. If we attempt to do this, 
Kant shows, we generate transcendental illusions. 
Let us take one example. In the first antinomy, Kant demonstrates that transcendental 
illusions occur whether we assume that the world (in its totality) has a beginning in 
time, or that it has no beginning in time. If we reason about the world in this way, i.e. if 
we extend our reason beyond its bounds, then we generate these illusions whichever 
standpoint we take up. Reason simply cannot extend beyond phenomena. We cannot be 
transcendental realists. In the first antinomy (Kant, 1781: A426/B454), Kant first sees 
what occurs if we attempt to prove that the world has a beginning in time. We might 
attempt this by assuming the opposite, that there is no beginning in time, and 
demonstrating why this would be impossible. If we assume this, and that there “has 
passed away in the world an infinite series of successive states of things” (ibid.), we 
realise the impossibility of this since a completed synthesis of events is required for us 
to speak of the world as a totality, and the world as a totality is exactly what we must be 
speaking of if we are claiming to speak of the world as it is in itself. A completed 
synthesis is required to be speaking about the world, but infinite time does not allow 
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this. So, the world cannot have no beginning in time, and must therefore have a 
beginning in time. However, Kant then goes on to demonstrate that the same sort of 
impossibility is generated if we attempt to prove that the world does not have a 
beginning in time. Again, he says, let us assume the opposite. Let us assume that there 
is a beginning in time. If this were the case, he says, there must have been a point in 
time at which the world (including time itself) started existing, meaning there must have 
been a time before the world existed. But in this “empty time” (ibid.) nothing can 
happen. (Another way to think of this is to say that if there was a time before the world 
(including time itself) existed, then the point at which it begins could not be considered 
the beginning of the world and time). Therefore, it is impossible for the world to have a 
beginning in time, and the world must have no beginning in time. 
The reason these conflicting theses and antitheses generate these impossibilities, Kant 
says, is because we are attempting to extend our reason beyond appearances and are 
attempting to cognise noumena. We are attempting to reason about the world as a 
totality, a completed synthesis, when such a concept only makes sense if it refers to the 
world in itself. Our reason, which employs categories and forms of intuition such as 
causation, and space and time, respectively, cannot apply itself to the world as a totality, 
because the world as it is in itself is outside of our representation. We do not have 
epistemic access to it.  
It might be asked how we can know the relation between thought and being when we 
cannot know anything about being itself. How can we know the relation between apples 
and oranges if we know nothing about oranges? The answer is that we could know the 
relation between apples and oranges even if we know nothing about oranges 
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themselves, providing we knew simply that it is a relation between apples and oranges. 
If the existence of apples necessitated the existence of an unknown ‘oranges’ then we 
could speak of the relation between the two that is entailed from this necessity without 
knowing exactly in what ‘oranges’ consist. 
In the same way, according to transcendental idealism, we can know the relation 
between thought and being despite not knowing being itself, because an appearance 
must be an appearance of something (the thing in itself), even if we do not know what 
this something is. In this way, the noumena are seen negatively as a limit: as that which 
is not known through sensibility. And, under transcendental idealism, we know that the 
in itself must exist because otherwise appearance could not. Gertz (2019: 32) explains 
this point concisely: “If experience depends on my existence, and my existence depends 
on experience, then there must be something that exists that is both beyond me and 
beyond experience since otherwise we’d be trapped in a chicken-and-egg paradox.” 
As for how the ‘thing in itself’ can ‘generate an appearance’ when it cannot ‘be an 
object of sensory awareness,’ Palmquist gives us a way of reconciling the two 
predications by saying their compatibility “becomes immediately apparent once it is 
recognised that the former refers to the thing in itself from the empirical perspective… 
while the latter refers to it from the transcendental perspective.” (1986: 128). 
The arguments that Kant provides are not supposed to be taken each as a definitive 
proof of the doctrine of transcendental idealism, rather they are intended to be taken all 
at once. This is why I began the section with the general idea of transcendental 
idealism, and some of Kant’s more intuitive and general arguments. In the next section I 
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bring the transcendental idealist picture of reality into light in its most basic form, 
removing from it all its Kantian terminology, and taking from it only what is necessary 
to continue our discussion on the meaning of life. 
4.2 The inaccessibility of the thing in itself 
Let us consider an analogy of a lantern in a pitch-black room. There might be tables and 
chairs in this room, perhaps a window, a cupboard, and so on. However, we cannot see 
them because all is dark. If we have a lantern, however, we may see the room. We can 
walk around and say to ourselves, ‘Here is a table, illuminated by my lantern. And here 
is a dark brown chair.’ But when we ask ourselves, ‘What does the chair look like 
without the lantern illuminating and colouring it for me to see?’, notice that there is no 
answer unless we again presuppose that the chair is illuminated. As soon as we attempt 
to picture what it might look like we are again presupposing being able to see it, in 
other words, presupposing it being illuminated for us. This analogy extends to 
representation in general. If we want to say anything about reality in some way, then we 
are attempting to represent reality. If we wish to represent reality as it is in itself, then 
this means we must represent it as it is free of representation—i.e. unilluminated. This 
is clearly impossible, because we cannot represent reality as it is when it is not being 
represented, just as we cannot imagine what the chair looks like when it is not visible. 
This is the picture of the world that Kant describes. As soon as we say that there is 
representation, then we must admit that we are incapable of transcending this 
representation, since any object which we might think about, perceive, or discuss must 
necessarily be the object as it is being represented. And if we are incapable of 
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transcending representation, then we cannot talk about, or imagine, or know the world 
as it is in itself, since it is precisely this that requires the transcendence of representation 
(otherwise it would not be the world ‘in itself’–it would be the world as it is ‘for us’). In 
other words, “we cannot adopt a third-person perspective that would allow us to 
compare things as they appear to us and things as they are in themselves.” (Bryant, 
2014). Thus, when we speak of the table or the chair, we are always speaking of the 
table or the chair for us, not as it is in itself, independent of representation. 
Meillassoux, in the first chapter of his After Finitude (2008), compellingly argues that 
ever since the critical transcendental idealism of Kant, philosophy has taken 
‘correlation’ as its central subject matter, rather than substance (ibid.: 6), and that much 
of post-Kantian philosophy has been ‘correlationist’. By ‘correlationism’ it is meant 
“the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between 
thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other.” (ibid.: 5). 
The implication of this correlationism is that we cannot know the world as it is in itself, 
because “we can’t distinguish between properties which are supposed to belong to the 
object and properties belonging to the subjective access to the object.” (Brassier et al., 
2007: 409). In this way, “what we know of anything is true only for us” (Bryant, 2014). 
One important aspect of Meillassoux’s account, and of the correlationist account, is that 
it includes other correlations than just the representation-reality relation. Bryant 
explains this well (ibid.): 
Although Meillassoux does not himself specify this, correlationism 
presumably comes in a variety of different forms, and is therefore not 
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restricted to theories focused on the relation between mind and being. 
Thus the relation between transcendental ego or lived body and the 
world in phenomenology would be one variant of correlationism, while 
the relation between language and being in Wittgenstein, Derrida and 
Lacan, or between power and knowledge in Foucault, would be other 
variants. In each case we encounter the claim that being cannot be 
thought apart from a subject, language or power. 
Meillassoux says the following (2008: 7-8, emphasis his): 
. . . we must emphasize that the correlation between thought and being is 
not reducible to the correlation between subject and object. In other 
words, the fact that correlation dominates contemporary philosophy in 
no way implies the dominance of philosophies of representation. It is 
possible to criticize the latter in the name of a more originary correlation 
between thought and being. And in fact, the critiques of representation 
have not signalled a break with correlation, i.e. a simple return to 
dogmatism. 
So, correlationist philosophies are ones that say we only ever have access to the 
correlation between thought and being, and not either of these things on their own. 
Thus, for Kant, the world is only the world as it is for us, in our representation; and how 
the world is for us is only ever the way that it is when it is related to the world. But the 
same can be said for any number of other correlates. Meillassoux says, “ever since 
Kant, to discover what divides rival philosophers is no longer to ask who has grasped 
the true nature of substantiality, but rather to ask who has grasped the more originary 
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correlation: is it the thinker of the subject-object correlation, the noetico-noematic 
correlation, or the language-referent correlation? The question is no longer ‘which is the 
proper substrate?’ but ‘which is the proper correlate?’” (ibid.: 6). 
Regarding correlationism’s pervasiveness throughout much of recent philosophy, we 
may consider two examples. First, there is the field of phenomenology, first developed 
most explicitly by Husserl (1900). Phenomenology takes ‘phenomena’ as its starting-
point, focusing on those things which “show themselves to consciousness” (Scruton, 
1981: 260, emphasis theirs). For phenomenologists, analysing what is most 
immediately known to us, phenomenally, is foundational to our successfully 
understanding consciousness and mental states. Once we have found pure immediacy 
(through, for example’s, Husserl’s process of ‘bracketing’), we may arrive at the 
process of the mind’s directedness upon the intentional objects: intentionality itself. 
This was Husserl’s most fundamental and immediate datum: the intentional process 
itself. 
We can see clearly the correlationist picture expounded within phenomenology if we 
consider the process of arriving at this intentional process. Scruton tells us the 
following, regarding phenomenological analysis of something such as fear (ibid.: 258, 
emphasis theirs): “I must not suppose that the object of fear exists independently of my 
fear. Fear does not guarantee the existence of its object, but only of its own ‘direction’ 
towards an object. We should therefore ‘bracket’ the material object in examining the 
nature of fear. But the intentional object remains: we cannot eliminate from fear the 
idea of an object, since this is contained in the mental state and immediately present to 
the consciousness of the man who fears.” So, we have bracketed the external object of 
71 
 
fear, but we still have the intentional object, due to the immediacy of our experience. 
We see here the clear bracketing of all other than the correlate: it is not the relationship 
between the external cause of fear and our internal fear that we are concerned with, 
rather it is the relationship between the fear and the idea of its object. And it is always 
the relationship between the two that is considered of immediate and fundamental 
importance, not the mental states or the intentional objects in themselves. The focus is 
on the correlation. 
A second example of correlationism comes from the philosophy of language, perhaps 
best seen in (the later) Wittgenstein. For brevity, we will treat Wittgenstein 
(specifically, the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations (1953)) simply, using 
only a general understanding of those aspects of his thinking that are relevant to the 
correlationist picture. The later Wittgenstein held a picture of philosophical 
understanding that placed language at the centre of investigation. In this way he 
remained faithful to his younger self (found in the Tractatus (1922)), and to logical 
atomists such as Russell and Moore. However, from this point he diverged. He realised 
that language and linguistic practice is as it is on no basis. In other words, there is “a 
denial that we can look outside linguistic practice for the thing which governs it” 
(Scruton, 1981: 280). Furthermore, language is fundamentally public, since we are 
‘always-already’ embedded within a language governed by rules on no basis, and since 
the notion of a private language is incoherent (this argued in his ‘private language 
argument’). So, we are always-already embedded in a public language which cannot be 
justified outside of its own rules and practices.  
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Regarding correlationism, we traditionally thought that what is true or what is necessary 
is a matter of discerning these things from reality; but for Wittgenstein, “nothing 
explains and justifies our accepting the necessary truths we do. That is to say, nothing 
explains and justifies our having the grammatical rules we have . . . Our rules do not 
correctly represent anything.” (Moore, 2012: 263, emphasis theirs). In order for our 
language to correctly represent something we would have to step outside of our 
language-game, and in doing so step outside the correlation between thought and being. 
For Wittgenstein, “being cannot be thought apart from . . . language” (Bryant, 2014). 
Thus, the limits of our language are the limits of our world, in the same way that, for 
Kant, the limits of our understanding are the limits of our world. We cannot escape the 
correlationist circle, which prevents us from comparing the thought of an object’s 
properties to the object’s properties in itself. We only ever have access to the correlate, 
and not to reality in itself. 
Where correlationism of representation, language, phenomenal experience, or anything 
else differs from an indirect external realism which posits that we only have access to 
our mental states and not the objects that they describe, is that with correlationism we 
have a strict focus on the transcendental relation. The focus is not on some veil that 
exists between our experience and the world, rather it is on how our experience relates 
to that world transcendentally, that is to say, how it relates to the world in itself when 
this world does not depend at all on my experience of it. The transcendentally 
inaccessible world is not there in the indirect external realist picture, rather it is the 
empirically inaccessible world that has the indirect external realist’s attention. For the 
critical or post-critical correlationist, to account for this relation between the 
transcendentally inaccessible world and our experience, thought itself must constitute 
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some of the most elemental things that allow us our experience to begin with – things 
like ‘space’ or ‘time’ that the indirect external realist would take to be actually ‘out 
there’ in the world itself. 
These are only a couple of examples of the correlationist picture expounded in more 
contemporary schools of thought, and merely go to illuminate what the core 
correlationist idea is: that we only have access to the relation between thought and 
being, and not being itself, regardless of what this correlate actually is. Whether the 
correlate is that of intentionality, language, representation, or something entirely 
different, the correlationist picture is present, and we have no access to reality in itself, 





5 The inaccessibility of a meaning of life 
If we were to hold to the ‘post-critical,’ correlationist picture of reality then, given all 
that we have discovered about what must constitute a meaning of life, we would be 
committed to saying that any meaning of life is in principle inaccessible. This is 
because a meaning of life would have to tell us something about the world in itself 
(being itself), and the correlationist picture denies that such knowledge is in principle 
obtainable. 
In 5.1., I outline why a meaning of life would have to tell us something about being 
itself, and why it would therefore be unknowable. In 5.2., I concretise this idea by 
discussing one possible explanation for the meaning of life: god. Such a meaning of life 
would not be knowable, but would be ontologically possible.  
5.1 The meaning of life and being itself 
We have said that the correlationist picture describes a world in which we only ever 
have access to the relationship between thought and being, not to being itself. We have 
also said that a meaning of life is an ultimate (global-metaphysical) explanation for life 
and existence which narrates across various elements of the most existential import to 
human beings. The key question to examine here is whether knowing an ultimate, 




Earlier (in 2.2) we used the game of chess as an analogy to help us understand the 
distinction between a meaning of life and meaning in life. Let us return to that analogy. 
Meaning in life, we said, is equivalent to asking about the rules of chess given the game 
itself is presupposed. The meaning of life is equivalent to asking about the 
presupposition(s) underpinning the game of chess itself. The former asks ‘what do we 
do within the game?’ and the latter ‘why does chess exist, anyway? What is its 
purpose?’ 
This distinction between questions about meaning within the game, and the meaning of 
the game, is in some ways dissimilar to the distinction between questions about thought 
and questions about being. If we are playing the game of chess with its existence and 
rules presupposed, then the game in itself – the framework of rules and purpose within 
which we are operating – is still accessible to us. To access these global questions about 
the game would be to question the presupposition of the rules and purpose of the game 
that we are playing, and we can do this because we also exist outside the game and are 
able to access a context from which the purpose of the game itself, even when we are 
operating within its framework, is interrogable. But this is not the case when it comes to 
our life; it is not the case when it comes to thought and being. With life we cannot 
remove ourselves from the framework that presupposes life and existence in order to 
interrogate the framework itself, because to do so would be to step outside of life and 
look at it from a God’s-eye point of view, which we cannot do. 
This is essentially another way of thinking about the Kantian picture of representation. 
We cannot get to the in itself because to do so would be to escape our representation of 
the world. We cannot uncover the framework itself because to do so would mean 
77 
 
leaving the framework. It would mean leaving the framework because any answer about 
the framework that we cognise will never be an answer about the framework in itself, in 
the same way that any experience of the world is not of the world in itself if it involves 
our representation of it (which, for us, it always will). Any attempt to speak of the 
framework in itself is prevented at the outset by the simple fact we are always acting 
from within it (whether you take this framework to be representation, language, or any 
other inescapable correlation between thought and being). 
Speaking of the framework in itself is the very thing that an answer to the meaning of 
life would require. An answer to the meaning of life must be a global-metaphysical 
explanation for life and existence. It must be an ultimate explanation, meaning it cannot 
leave the door open to taking that further step back that Edwards (1972) claimed any 
answer to the question always would (an argument that we rejected in 3.2). 
If we accept the correlationist picture of the world, such an explanation is only suitably 
ultimate and final if it exists beyond the world of appearances – beyond the framework 
for existence itself. Kant demonstrated this in the antinomies that we discussed in 4.1. If 
we attempt to find any finality in the world as it appears to us, we are doomed to failure, 
just as we are if we attempt to find an infinity in place of a finality. When we do this, 
we are attempting to view things in themselves as knowable noumena, which is not 
possible since things in themselves are unknowable. 
As such, under critical or post-critical correlationism, it would be impossible to know 
whether there is an ultimate, global-metaphysical explanation for life and existence, 
since to know as much would require us having epistemic access to the in itself, which 
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is (according to correlationism) in principle impossible. Therefore, we cannot ever 
know the meaning of life. 
5.2 Could we know that god is the answer to the meaning of life? 
Let us concretise this idea of an unknowable meaning of life under correlationism with 
an example. One possible explanation for a meaning of life would be that a necessary 
god created us and existence itself for some purpose. This would be a suitably global-
metaphysical explanation for life and existence, and it would narrate across issues of 
existential import to human beings. Let us say that this god created us to live in his 
image as benevolently as possible, spreading goodness as far as possible. This would be 
a metaphysical answer, because it would explain the existence of things in a way that is 
final, due to this god’s necessary nature. It would be global, since it would be a purpose 
for each and every one of us – or, rather, for all of us collectively. It would answer to 
those issues of most existential import to us, since if we knew everything about this god 
and his plan and his creation, then we would know something about death, suffering, 
the grounding of our personal goals, and so on. We would have a perfectly satisfactory 
philosophical answer to the meaning of life. 
One objection to the relevance of such an answer to the meaning of life is that we could 
still picture our lives as meaningless even if this god explanation were granted. We 
could still say to ourselves: ‘Sure, that’s the answer, but I don’t feel like what I’m doing 
is any more meaningful.’ To this I would first say that if we felt this way we would 
simply be misunderstanding what sort of meaning we have been given. We would be 
looking for meaning in life, or the feeling of meaningfulness, not the meaning of life. 
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Gordon (2013: 141) points out that our “role in God’s larger drama,” given this 
explanation for a meaning of life, would not be a sufficient one, rather only a necessary 
one. So perhaps the questioner would be satisfied if they knew a bit more about how 
this god affects those elements of most existential import to us; if not, again, they were 
probably never looking for the meaning of life to begin with, rather just a subjective 
feeling of meaningfulness.  
Gordon (ibid.: 146-8) goes on to argue against god’s purpose being a satisfactory 
answer to the meaning of life. “Will not this very design,” he says, “stand as a brute 
given in our explanation of the world?” In other words, how is the god explanation any 
better than any other “brute given” that we are not satisfied with? He mentions how one 
might respond to this argument, in a way strikingly similar to my own response to 
Ayer’s discussion of god in 3.1. One might respond, Gordon says, by saying “[t]he 
purposes of God, then, provide the ultimate teleological explanation because there is 
nothing outside God and his Creation to which we can address the (illegitimate) 
question of the purpose of God’s purposes.” Gordon replies that this argument “does 
not, however, demonstrate the incoherence in the question, “What is the purpose of God 
and his Creation?” It provides a reason that an answer cannot be given; it does not 
provide a reason that the question cannot be asked.” But the logical necessity of this 
question’s unanswerableness, while not providing reason that the question cannot be 
asked, does provide reason that it should not be asked. If we are not happy with the 
answer, that would not change the fact that it is the answer. 
Gordon goes on to argue that even if we accept that god’s purposes provide ultimate 
teleological justification, it would still not be a sufficient answer to the meaning of life, 
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because we are “nevertheless left with the task of justifying his creative enterprise” 
(ibid.: 147). We have already refuted this argument in 3.1 when it came from Ayer: if 
we are given an ultimate purpose by a transcendent and necessary god, then this is our 
purpose regardless of what we think of it. In order to argue that this is not the case, you 
have to provide a reason why purpose must be chosen or arbitrated by us – a discussion 
which would lead us away from the meaning of life and onto humanistic meaning in 
life. 
However, if we could not ask about this god’s purpose since to do so would be to ask 
about the world in itself, could we ever know the truth or falsehood of such an answer 
to the meaning of life as the god explanation under the correlationist picture? The 
answer to this is, on the face of it, and according to critical philosophy, no, since a god 
that created us must have an existence that is a part of the in itself, and we can never 
access the in itself. If one responds that we are ourselves a part of the in itself, and we 
know ourselves empirically, the Kantian might respond that we do not actually know 
our ‘self’ as it is in itself. A god of appearances (as opposed to the in itself) would not 
be a satisfactory answer to the meaning of life, because we could always question what 
this god is in itself. In other words, such a god would not be suitably metaphysical, 
since it would not answer to the framework itself, rather it would be an answer from 
within the framework. As such, any answer to the meaning of life, including god, 
cannot be one situated within the framework of appearance. And a god outside the 
framework of appearance is unknowable according to the correlationist. Under 
correlationism, this answer to the meaning of life is in principle unknowable because it 
is an answer to the meaning of life, and as soon as it becomes knowable it is no longer 
an answer to the meaning of life. 
81 
 
This is why correlationism poses a problem for the legitimacy of the question of the 
meaning of life. The correlationist can admit that it is ontologically possible for there to 
exist a meaning of life, but to them the question ‘What is the meaning of life?’ is 
illegitimate, since the question itself requires any answer to be unknowable. If a 
proposed answer is knowable, it is not an answer to the meaning of life, and if it is an 
answer to the meaning of life then it is unknowable. And asking a question that requires 
the answer to be unknowable is pointless, since there can never be an answer that 
pertains to the question as it is intended. It is still a question that can be asked, however, 
even if it is a pointless question to ask. Just because you know your curiosity can never 
be satisfied does not mean that you cannot be curious. This is a different kind of 
question than one such as ‘what colour are square circles?’ because the correlationist 
still admits the possibility of an answer ontologically, but says that this answer can 
never be one that we know, whereas this square circle question is logically 
contradictory. The square circle question is logically contradictory because there could 
never be an answer, but there could be an answer to the meaning of life question out 
there in the world in itself, it could just never be knowable. The square circle question 
does not even permit an unknowable answer, unlike the meaning of life. 
This does not mean that the god explanation could not actually be the answer, however. 
Just because (according to correlationism) we could never know the existence of a 
transcendent god does not mean that one could not exist. And just because we could 
never know the existence of one does not, by default, mean that we could not talk about 
the implications of such a god existing, as long as this discussion does not go further 
than talking merely about the implications of the potential fact of a god’s existence – 
we could not, for example, talk about the nature of this god and its meaning in any 
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substantive way, since, absent the possibility for experience of it, we would have no 
reason to choose one competing type of nature over another. And, of course, such talk 
would have to be manoeuvred carefully, considering we would have to make sure we 
were not extending reason beyond its boundaries into the realm of the in itself where 
such concepts cannot be applied. What form this discussion would take would depend 
on whether we took a Kantian approach (which would consider non-erroneous 
conceptions of god as merely intellectual constructs with no metaphysical basis) or 
some other approach to the distinction between appearance and reality in itself, and 
such discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
It might be objected that surely we cannot even discuss god if it would have to exist 
beyond appearance, considering the in itself is unknowable. However, providing we use 
god to mean only a negation of limits, the supremely unconditioned, this would not 
generate transcendental errors. On the conceivability of god Kant says the following: 
“Can we, on such grounds, assume a wise and omnipotent Author of the world? 
Undoubtedly we may; and we not only may, but must, do so. But do we then extend our 
knowledge beyond the field of possible experience? By no means. All that we have 
done is merely to presuppose a something, a merely transcendental object, of which, as 
it is in itself, we have no concept whatsoever.” (Kant, 1781: A697/B725-A698/B726, 
emphasis his). According to Kant’s transcendental idealism, the supersensible is 
thinkable, but, as Pasternack (Pasternack et al., 2020) points out, we can “think about it 
in too many ways” because “[a]bsent experience, reason is without a touchstone 
through which hypotheses can be refuted.” He goes on to say, “The problem, for Kant, 
is thus not about meaning, but rather it is epistemic: having no possible experience of 
the supersensible, we lack the theoretical resources to adjudicate between competing 
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claims.” (ibid.). Taking god as an example, under a correlationist picture we might say 
that the possibility to continually question god’s purpose, and then question the reason 
for this purpose, and so on (e.g. Gordon, 2013: 148), only occurs when we question our 
concept of an empirical god, i.e. within the realm of appearances. There is no 
experience possible that could adjudicate on where the final resting point should lie, 
because to gain this experience would require accomplishing the impossible task of 
experiencing the world in itself.  
Belief in God, for Kant, comes from a moral rather than an empirical standpoint, which 
(according to Kant, at least) provides grounds for faith in the existence of God without 
claiming to know that God exists empirically. In other words, it is not through 
theoretical reason but through practical reason that we can say that God exists – if 
practical reason necessitates God’s existence then we would “be entitled to base belief 
in God’s existence on what ought to be – on the existence of obligation – rather than on 
what is. This would amount to moral theology (as distinct from theological ethics, for 
which God’s existence is a presupposition).” (Gardner, 1999: 315-6). This is knowledge 
of a different sort – practically grounded knowledge rather than empirical or theoretical 
knowledge. The following and final chapter, however, deals with attempts to render the 
meaning of life (with God being one such possible explanation) in principle 






6 Routes towards ultimate meaning 
Let us briefly recap what we have discovered so far. First, we have discovered that 
there is a primary distinction between the meaning of life and meaning in life. The 
former refers to a global-metaphysical explanation for life and existence that narrates 
across those elements of most existential import to human beings. In other words, it is 
an ‘ultimate’ explanation. While it must involve purpose-meaning and significance-
meaning, what ties all these constituting elements of meaning together is intelligibility-
meaning, which connects all aspects of meaning under a single explanation that might 
be called ‘total’ meaning. 
We discovered that the question of the meaning of life is legitimate despite some of the 
most initially compelling arguments against its legitimacy. However, we have also 
discovered that if one takes a correlationist or transcendental idealist line on the nature 
of reality, then an ultimate meaning of life is rendered unknowable. Correlationist 
metaphysics (or, sometimes, anti-metaphysics), if it does not accept Kant’s moral faith 
argument, might also result in the proclamation that the question of the meaning of life 
is illegitimate, as the answer’s unknowability arguably renders the question either 
meaningless or pointless. 
This final chapter explores possible routes towards ultimate meaning given all that we 
have learnt so far. If a meaning of life must be a global-metaphysical explanation for 
life and existence, in which ways can we approach a meaning of life that allows for its 
legitimacy? Must we deny correlationism and transcendental idealism, or is there a way 
to maintain the question’s legitimacy even under these metaphysical frameworks? 
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In 6.1, I outline two attempts that have been made to render the in itself (and thereby 
the existence or non-existence of, and nature of, the meaning of life) knowable despite 
transcendental idealism. Both Fichte and Schopenhauer stick to a transcendental idealist 
conception of reality but attempt to render the in itself knowable in order to gain true 
metaphysical insight about the ultimate nature of reality. 
In 6.2, I outline metaphysical and epistemological alternatives to transcendental 
idealism that would render the meaning of life knowable in principle. These 
metaphysics are empirical idealism, direct external realism, and indirect external 
realism, but only when they are taken in their transcendentally realist forms. In other 
words, the two possible ways to render a meaning of life knowable are: (1) by arguing, 
like some post-Kantians, that we can infer things about the world in itself despite the 
distinction between reality and appearance, or (2) by arguing either that the way that 
things appear can be identical to the way things really are (empirical idealism) or that 
our appearances can correspond in some way with reality as it is in itself. In all cases, 
the world in itself is supposedly rendered knowable, and a meaning of life thereby 
becomes in principle accessible to inference or deduction. 
In this Chapter I do not assess whether each attempt succeeds or fails in its attempt to 
render the world in itself knowable, rather I provide a sketch of the possible 
metaphysical positions that one may take to in principle render the world in itself 




6.1 Moving beyond appearance 
After Kant, even many of those philosophers who concurred with the general 
transcendental idealist distinction between the ‘world in itself’ and the ‘world for us’ 
were not happy to leave the former as epistemically inaccessible. This was especially so 
for some of the German idealists that followed in Kant’s wake, such as Fichte. “[L]ike 
the other great German idealists who developed their ideas from Fichte’s initial 
inspiration,” says Leach and Tartaglia (Leach and Tartaglia, 2018), “he thought Kant 
had stopped short at the threshold of metaphysical insight.” 
This is a fairly common frustration upon discovering Kant’s transcendental idealism. 
While Kant attempts to give metaphysical insight into what must be the case in reality 
by means of transcendental deduction, what occurs with transcendental idealism is 
arguably not an uncovering of the nature of true reality, but instead the description of an 
intermediary reality which, along with our minds, co-constitutes the world as we know 
it. For those seeking metaphysical insight – i.e. those attempting to discover the 
fundamental nature of reality – Kant might be seen to have substituted the ‘reality’ of 
fundamental metaphysical insight with a different type of ‘reality’, one which is not 
quite as real as we might have hoped.  
This is a different sort of scepticism about reality than that which arises from, for 
example, Cartesian doubt. Where Descartes says that external reality is independent of 
our internal states, and only thereafter attempts to prove the existence of this reality and 
the epistemic credibility of our perceptions of it, Kant instead says that external reality 
is not proven by the relationship between our immediately acquainted mental states’ 
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relationship to external reality, but that our internal states depend upon this external 
reality for us to be acquainted with them at all. This results in a co-constitution that 
guarantees both internal and external states’ existence, and then moves the veil, behind 
which lies the true ‘unknown reality’, a further layer back. It is, in many ways, a deeper 
scepticism than Descartes’ that might occur from this understanding of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism, because the realm of the unknown is entirely separated from 
our inner states, the external world that we perceive, and the relationship between the 
two.  
Fichte, one of many post-Kantians that was not happy to leave the in itself so far 
removed, attempted to resolve this problem by arguing that the unknowable realm is, in 
fact, knowable. This true reality is an individual’s own will as a manifestation of the 
infinite will. For Fichte, the ego must postulate the non-ego in order for our moral 
natures to make sense, and this interplay is projected onto the nature of ultimate reality 
as absolute ego. For Fichte, the in itself can be directly known in the case of the self: I 
have an immediate intuition of my self as it is in itself, and this intuition is ‘intellectual’ 
in the Kantian sense, in that it involves active creation from within. The immediate 
intuition that I act – that my self acts – is the starting-point for Fichte, and this is a 
knowledge of something in itself, quite unlike the picture painted by Kant. 
However, while this was a departure from the Kantian system, in other ways Fichte 
explicitly operated within Kant’s critical framework, since he saw “no way of making 
naturalistic sense of the knowing willing subject” (Moore, 2012: 148) – “naturalism”, 
here, is referring to the dogmatism that Kant opposed). The in itself is immediately 
intuited, and all other things that are known are mediated through our ‘spectacles’. The 
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immediately intuited subject is not thought of as an object like the off-limit world in 
itself, but instead as an act. This act is in creating “the conditions for its very own 
creativity. It creates itself.” (ibid.: 153) – in this sense (of its creating being the 
condition for its own creativity) Fichte’s account is transcendental, because it is an 
argument based on the conditions of possibility for creativity. Fichte believed that “all 
human understanding is ultimately rooted in the practical and moral imperatives of will; 
in acts of conscience guided by a faith that our endless individual strivings are in 
accordance with an infinite and benevolent will” (Leach and Tartaglia, 2018: 280). For 
the Jena Romantics like Fichte, self-creation in accordance with the divine will was the 
meaning of life. 
Direct and immediate intuition of the will as a manifestation of the absolute is one way 
we might attempt to render the in itself knowable given a transcendental idealist 
framework, then. But some, like Schopenhauer, thought that this was incorrect, and 
thought that, instead, a Kantian metaphysics “that does not lapse into the charlatanry of 
purported ‘intellectual intuition’ of the absolute” (Young, 2014: 53) is necessary. 
Schopenhauer thought that for many post-Kantians, “Reason was supposed to denote an 
entirely imaginary, fictitious faculty, admitting us, as it were, to a little window 
overlooking the superlunar, nay, the supernatural world, through which all those truths 
are handed to us ready cut and dried, concerning which old-fashioned, honest, reflective 
Reason had for ages vainly argued and contended.” (Schopenhauer, 1813: 139). 
For Schopenhauer, “it is on such a mere product of the imagination, such a completely 
fictitious Reason as this, that German sham philosophy has been based for the last fifty 
years; first, as the free construction and projection of the absolute Ego and the 
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emanation from it of the non-Ego; then, as the intellectual intuition of absolute identity 
or indifference, and its evolutions to Nature; or again, as the arising of God out of his 
dark depths or bottomless pit à la Jakob Böhme; lastly, as the pure, self-thinking, 
absolute Idea, the scene of the ballet-dance of the self-moving conceptions – still, at the 
same time, always as immediate apprehension […] of the Divine, the supersensuous, 
the Deity, verity, beauty and as many other "-ties" as may be desired, or even as a mere 
vague presentiment of all these wonders. So this is Reason, is it? Oh no, it is simply a 
farce, of which our professors of philosophy, who are sorely perplexed by Kant's 
serious critiques, avail themselves in order to pass off the subjects of the established 
religion of their country somehow or other, per fas aut nefas, for the results of 
philosophy.” (ibid., emphasis theirs). Direct experience of the in itself, the ‘immediate 
intuition’ of the subject as with Fichte, is a “farce” – but there is still another way to 
know the true nature of reality, according to Schopenhauer, one that does not involve 
“such a completely fictitious Reason as this”, one that is properly Kantian. 
Schopenhauer, in The World as Will and Representation (1819), takes an approach that 
he considers to be more true to the spirit of Kant’s critical philosophy than that of other 
post-Kantians like the Jena Romantics. He takes the ideality of our world of 
appearances as a given, and thinks that to question this after Kant “would be as absurd 
as questioning the heliocentric account of the cosmos after Galileo” (Young, 2014: 51). 
He says that “[w]ith the exception of my own body, I know only one side of things, that 
of representation: the inner essence of things is closed to me and remains a deep 
mystery, even when I know everything that causes alterations in them” (Schopenhauer, 
1819: 149). But just because the world of appearances is ideal it does not follow, 
Schopenhauer argues, that we cannot know anything about the world in itself. There is 
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still the possibility for metaphysics, and thus (this being my own inference, not 
Schopenhauer’s) the possibility of discovering a meaning of life. It only follows that we 
cannot have direct experience of the in itself (ruling out Fichte’s notion of the infinite 
will), not that we can know nothing about it. 
Young (2014: 52) analogises this way of thinking about metaphysics to the way we 
think about molecules: “Metaphysics, suggests Schopenhauer, can be conceived in a 
similar way: its status as knowledge is based entirely on experience, yet because its 
topic lies beyond experience – in a way analogous to the way in which molecules lie 
beyond experience – it can count as genuinely metaphysical.” In other words, just 
because we cannot directly experience molecules does not mean that we cannot infer 
their existence and characteristics; similarly, just because we cannot experience the in 
itself, says Schopenhauer, does not mean that we cannot infer its existence and 
characteristics. But what do we look at to make this inference? What route is there to 
the in itself when direct experience is unavailable? 
Schopenhauer says this route is found through contemplating our understanding of the 
world of appearances. The world of appearances is often explained through atomistic 
means: in the modern world, we explain physical objects in terms of molecules, 
molecules in terms of atoms, atoms in terms of electrons, protons, and neutrons, and 
these in terms of quarks, and so on. Schopenhauer argues that in order to explain 
physical causality we must, at some point, posit the existence of brute forces. These 
forces, rather than physical structures which can always be broken down further, are the 
ultimate constituting force in the universe.  
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From there, he extrapolates further to interpret these forces as will, by way of 
comparison with our only direct experience of such a force: the internal will. The 
source of this knowledge, then, comes from our experience of the world of appearances, 
but it infers beyond itself to the realm of ultimate reality through the necessary positing 
of force. And this force is interpreted as ‘will’, which we know from our own 
experience of it. Schopenhauer “aims directly to apprehend an aspect of himself that in 
addition to constituting his own inner being, could also constitute the inner being of any 
physical object,” (Wicks, 2018: 156), and this is found to be the ‘will’, which is then 
generalised to all of reality. Thus, what one “recognises as his own essence is the same 
thing that constitutes the essence of the world in its entirety, the essence of the 
macrocosm: and thus it is, like himself both will through and through and representation 
through and through; nothing more remains” (Schopenhauer, 1819: 212). 
Reality in itself, then, is the will, and from there Schopenhauer goes on to attempt to 
demonstrate why this ultimate nature expresses itself in us as suffering, and why we 
should attempt to break free of this suffering by denying the will in its entirety, and by 
dying a death through lack of will to life rather than as a will-affirming act of suicide. 
As far as a meaning of life goes, however, “ultimate reality or, following Immanuel 
Kant’s terminology, the “thing-in-itself,” is nothing more than an aimless, meaningless 
impulse, and by implication, so is life.” (Wicks, 2018: 150). There is no purpose to the 
will – no end goal – so it is ultimately meaningless, as is life which is guided by it. As 
an answer to the question “what is the meaning of life?” this might seem unsatisfying, 
as it answers: “there is none”; but it does traverse the supposedly unsurpassable gulf 
between the world of appearances and the world in itself to provide an answer. 
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It is important to note one way that Schopenhauer’s explanation might be considered 
similar to Fichte’s and those of other post-Kantians like Hegel. Fichte takes the in itself 
to be directly experienced as the will of the self, which is a manifestation of the 
ultimate, absolute will. Schopenhauer thinks that this is not truly Kantian, because it is 
claiming direct access to the in itself, whereas Kant thought that direct knowledge of 
the self would mean that “no one could then deny our right of advancing yet further in 
this domain [of noumena], indeed of settling in it, and, should our star prove auspicious, 
of establishing claims to permanent possession” (Kant, 1781: B410) . Instead, 
Schopenhauer thinks, we cannot directly experience the in itself, but we can experience 
the world as it appears to us and then infer its underlying nature (forces) by 
interrogating what must necessarily lie at the bottom of all appearances, and then 
interpret this by comparing it to something we do directly experience: our own will. 
This requires Schopenhauer to distinguish between his comparing of appearances to our 
will, and Fichte’s immediate intuition of the self as it is in itself, otherwise he would be 
falling into the same trap that he accuses other post-Kantians of falling into, because to 
infer that ultimate reality is the ‘will’, just like that which we directly perceive, it 
appears that you must say that this directly experienced will is as it is itself. Otherwise, 
why should we accept that the posited base forces of nature are similar to our own will 
at all and can be characterised in such a way? It is only by assuming that the internal 
will is as it is in itself that we can map it onto reality in itself, otherwise we would only 
be mapping an appearance of will onto a (supposedly necessary) notion of force or will 
in nature, and this would not tell us anything about what this will is like in itself. But is 
there really such a difference between understanding an underlying reality in terms of a 
directly experienced will, and immediately intuiting the reality as self-will? 
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Still, whether or not this move to interpretation of the will is justified, we have, with 
Schopenhauer, one way in which we might attempt to discover a meaning of life despite 
the distinction between the world in itself and the world of appearances: by 
interrogating our experience of reality to discover a reality that goes beyond experience, 
in the same way that we interrogate a physical object to discover its underlying 
structure. Schopenhauer attempted to remove the barrier to knowledge of the in itself by 
arguing that true reality can be discovered despite us being unable to directlyexperience 
it. Fichte and other post-Kantians like Hegel attempted to remove this barrier by saying 
that we can, in fact, directly experience the in itself, and that we do this via the self. 
6.2 Denying the distinction between reality and appearance 
Transcendental idealism and those correlationist philosophies that follow in its wake 
pose an epistemological problem for the meaning of life, because the ultimate nature of 
reality, which is where the meaning of life must be found, is rendered entirely 
unknowable. This is distinct to sceptical responses to indirect perception because the 
transcendental idealist thinks that even those realities themselves that are indirectly 
perceived (for example, the primary properties of an object), as well as our perceptions 
of them, are part of the world of appearance. The world as it is in itself is further – 
completely – removed from the realm of possible experience and therefore knowledge. 
In the previous section we saw one way that we can attempt to resolve this 
epistemological problem: by inferring or directly experiencing the in itself in some way 
despite the distinction between the world in itself and the world of appearances 
remaining intact – in other words, by rendering the in itself accessible to reason through 
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rendering the meaning of life knowable, rather it is a belief in a meaning of life despite its 
unknowability. 
some means and in some way. But there is a further way we may respond to the 
problem, and that is by denying the transcendental idealist premise and instead 
presenting a picture of the world in which we always directly perceive reality as it is in 
itself – in other words, we could espouse transcendental realism1. The epistemological 
theory of direct perception, as it is found in direct external realism and idealism 
presents another way of rendering the meaning of life knowable, providing we mean 
transcendental realist forms of these metaphysics. In a way this goes without saying, 
because if transcendental idealism poses a problem then clearly the denial of 
transcendental idealism would resolve this problem. However, it is useful to outline in 
which precise way the problem is resolved, and to explore why direct perception would 
resolve the problem in a way that post-Kantian philosophies do not.  
Let us take direct (or ‘naïve’) realism first. Crane and French say direct external realism 
holds “that the veridical experiences involved in genuine cases of perception consist, in 
their nature, of relations to ordinary objects” and that “this is put to work in explaining 
the phenomenal character of such experiences.” (2017). It is important not to confuse 
this with (external) realism on its own. Realism, as Searle argues in Chapter 7 of The 
Construction of Social Reality, consists only of the ontological proposition that “[t]he 
world (or alternatively, reality or the universe) exists independently of our 
representation of it” (1996: 150). On the face of it this runs counter to transcendental 
idealism, since one of Kant’s central claims is that the world is not independent of our 
representation of it. However, the “world” of external realism is referring to the world 
in itself, not the world of appearance that the transcendental idealist says is dependent 
on our representation. 
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External realism simply claims that there exists a reality that is out there, independent 
of our representation of it. Indeed, Searle says that there is nothing epistemic about 
realism, and that “[i]t would be consistent with realism to suppose that any kind of 
“view” of reality is quite impossible” (ibid.: 154).  
Direct external realism, on the other hand, adds an epistemological claim onto external 
realism, this claim being that we directly access or perceive this representation-
independent reality. If we can directly perceive a representation-independent reality 
then we can directly perceive the world as it is in itself, and we are therefore, and at 
least in principle, capable of directly perceiving things which might lead us to infer the 
existence of a meaning of life. In other words, there would be no difficulty moving 
from our experience of the world to inferring the ultimate nature of reality and what this 
means for the meaning of life, since our experience of the world would not be 
principally disconnected from reality as it is in itself. We would not in principle lack the 
experience to adjudicate between competing claims about the world as it is in itself: our 
notions of causation, substance, objecthood, and so on would apply to the world as it is 
in itself, and could therefore be used as tools to attempt to deduce or infer a meaning of 
life. 
Indirect external realism might also mean that we could in principle discover a meaning 
of life, but this would depend on the particular indirect external realism in question. 
Transcendental idealism is distinct from many takes on indirect external realism where 
true reality (the in itself) is concerned. If we are talking about the world as it is in itself, 
as we must be to discuss an ultimate meaning of life, then under transcendental idealism 
we do not perceive it at all, either directly or indirectly. It can only be in the empirical 
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sense that we regard Kant as an indirect or direct external realist: transcendentally ideal, 
and empirically real. If we take a transcendentally real perspective, however, then, just 
like direct external realism, we could in principle discover a meaning of life. If our 
experiences map onto reality in a reliable way (taking reliabilism as one example) then 
we can infer the existence of a meaning of life from our indirect or direct experiences of 
reality (which are objects as they are in themselves, on the transcendentally real 
account) as we can be sure our inferences about the ultimate nature of reality are within 
the realms of possible experience. Transcendental realism in both direct external realist 
and indirect external realist forms, then, renders a meaning of life in principle 
knowable. 
Empirical idealism, which claims that reality is mind-dependent, would, like empirical 
realism, also mean that a meaning of life could in principle be deduced or inferred. It 
might be claimed that empirical idealism ‘does away with’ the notion of reality in itself 
because under empirical idealism there is no more mind-independent reality. However, 
what makes something that thing ‘in itself’ is that it is the final fact or form of the 
matter. As such, if we have a picture that describes true reality as mind-dependent, then 
instead of this being a dismissal of the in itself we have in fact rendered – or attempted 
to render – the in itself knowable because the self and the mind is immediately 
knowable. There is no barrier in principle between our immediate experience and the 
world ‘in itself’ with empirical idealism because the world in itself is directly knowable 
as ‘idea’. 
It does not make sense to say that this does away with the in itself, as some forms of 
phenomenalism might do, unless we also claim that this mind-dependent world is 
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unreal (i.e. not as it is in itself), in which case we return to a distinction between the 
world and reality, in other words, transcendental idealism. Except, this time, it is 
unclear where the distinction between the in itself and the world of appearances would 
lie – or, what the in itself would consist of – since if there is nothing that is not mind-
dependent, and this mind-dependent reality is only appearance, then there is little room 
for the in itself. For empirical idealism to be distinct from transcendental idealism we 
must accept that it makes claims about and attempts to describe the world in itself rather 
than do away with it. If it does not do this then it must argue that there is no way that 
anything is something in itself at all, which does not characterise empirical idealism. 
Empirical idealism renders the meaning of life knowable in principle in the same way 
that direct external realism does by saying that reality in itself is directly perceived. The 
only difference is, for the idealist, reality is not externally real and material: the mental 
is the ultimate foundation of what exists, and, because we are immediately acquainted 
with the mental, we are immediately acquainted with the ultimate nature of reality. It is 
still a theory of direct perception, which is what allows for epistemological optimism 
about the meaning of life, but it is antirealist in the external sense. If reality is 
constituted of the mental, either completely or foundationally, and if we have 
immediate access to the mental, then there is no veil for us to pierce to access a more 
‘real’ type of reality – we have everything right in front of us, so to speak. The idealist 
has less to account for epistemologically than the realist, at least regarding our present 
discussion, because while the direct and indirect external realist must account the 
relation between object and experience, for the idealist our experience is the object. 
This immediate and direct perception of the in itself allows the empirical idealist to 
reason about the in itself and potentially infer the meaning of life. 
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With direct external realism, indirect external realism, and empirical idealism, we 
render a meaning of life in principle epistemically obtainable if we are operating from a 
transcendentally real perspective. With these philosophies the ‘in itself’ is not done 
away with, rather it is said to coincide with our experience, whether that experience is 
of an external reality or a mind-constituted one. What is important, then, is the denial of 
a separation between reality and experience. If our experience of the world and the 
world in itself can coincide, as with idealism, then we can experience the world as it is 
in itself, and if we are directly or indirectly experiencing the external world as it is in 
itself then, similarly, we are experiencing things the way they truly are. In all cases we 
are in principle capable of reasoning about the in itself and potentially inferring the 







Conclusion: epistemological optimism  
There are two separate kinds of question regarding the meaning of life. The first, 
epistemological type of question, is, “Can we know whether there is a meaning of 
life?”, or “Can we know what the meaning of life is?”, and, following this, “How can 
we know the meaning of life?” The second, ontological type of question, is, “Is there a 
meaning of life”, and, following this, “What is the meaning of life, irrespective of our 
knowledge of it?”. These questions, strictly speaking, deal only with the nature and 
existence of a meaning of life regardless of whether or not we can know it. We have 
primarily focused our attention on the former, epistemological question, and our 
discussion of the latter has consisted in outlining possible explanations for a meaning of 
life given what one must consist in, rather than assessing any particular answer. In other 
words, we have not attempted to answer the question “What is the meaning of life?”, 
but have instead attempted to narrow down which kinds of answer would be sufficient 
given what is being requested by the question.  
When the question is asked in its usual form – “What is the meaning of life?” – this is a 
request for an answer to any and all of the above. “The meaning of life is to live as God 
commands”, or “The meaning of life is to become alien grub”, or “There is no meaning 
of life”, or “We cannot ever know the meaning of life”, or “We can know what the 
meaning of life is in principle, but I don’t know the answer or whether there is an 
answer at all” are all perfectly sufficient responses to the question, providing there is 
enough evidence or a convincing enough argument provided for the response in 
question. This, in the same way that someone asking, “What exists outside of the 
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currently observable universe?” might find the answers “Nothing”, “More of the same”, 
“A giant green Tortoise”, or “We don’t know” all sufficient. 
We cannot answer “What is the meaning of life?” in the ontological sense if we cannot 
know whether there is a meaning of life. And if we do think that a meaning of life, 
should one exist, would be knowable, but that there is in fact no such meaning, then this 
answers both the ontological and epistemological question: we know that the meaning 
of life does not exist. Any positive answer to the question “What is the meaning of 
life?” must answer both epistemological and ontological questions, because to do so is 
to claim knowledge of its existence and its nature. An answer to the epistemological 
question, however, clearly requires no answer to the ontological one, because it is 
possible to say that we can or cannot know a meaning of life in principle without 
claiming to know anything about the existence, non-existence, or nature of one in 
practice. 
In terms of how we come to approach the meaning of life as human beings, the 
epistemological question comes before the ontological one. We cannot answer the 
ontological question without either explicitly answering the epistemological one or 
otherwise implicitly presupposing an answer to the epistemological one. In either case, 
both positive and negative ontological answers presuppose a positive epistemological 
one. But we have seen that Kant’s transcendental idealism and the correlationism that 
follows in its wake pose a serious threat to this epistemological optimism regarding the 
meaning of life. If we cannot know reality in itself, and if a meaning of life requires 
knowing reality in itself (which, as argued in Chapter 2, it does), then we cannot ever 
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know the meaning of life, and all ontological claims about the existence or non-
existence of one are unfounded and possibly even meaningless. 
Possible responses to this problem were discussed in Chapter 6. The epistemological 
problem that transcendental idealism and correlationism poses is that, if we hold to 
these philosophies, the world outside of representation, or language, or any number of 
other thought-being relations, is unknowable as we cannot experience being itself and 
therefore cannot reach a viewpoint removed enough to answer the question of the 
ultimate meaning of life. So, if we want to render the meaning of life epistemically 
accessible, we must either (1) argue, like Fichte and Schopenhauer, that we can infer 
things about the world in itself despite our inability to experience it, or (2) argue that 
there is no distinction between reality in itself and appearance because reality is either 
(a) directly experienced as external, (b) indirectly but correctly experienced as external, 
or (c) directly experienced as mind-constituted. These are the only ways to render a 
meaning of life knowable. 
Edwards’ objection to the meaning of life question (an argument that we rejected in 
section 3.2) rests in part upon his claim that any answer to the meaning of life will 
always be said to not go far back enough. Despite us rejecting his overall argument, this 
rejection of any potential answer to the meaning of life as not going back far enough is 
a very real instinct. Let us take god as an example. If we say that a god created 
everything, and the meaning of life is to live as it commands, then it seems very 
reasonable to reject this answer as one that does not go back far enough, for we can still 
question ‘Where did this god come from?’ The transcendental idealist might say that 
this impulse to request further justification or levels of explanation occurs because we 
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are attempting to extend our reason beyond the realm of appearances and onto the world 
as a totality, which does not make sense. However, if we hold to either (1) or (2) above, 
and if we have arrived at this god explanation by some means, then we may reject the 
‘it does not go back far enough’ impulse as incorrect or irrelevant (incorrect if we take 
it as a proposition and irrelevant if we take it as a subjective expression of 
dissatisfaction towards the answer). A necessary god would be the final resting point, 
whether we felt like it could be questioned further or not. If it could be questioned 
further then it would not be a ‘necessary’ god. And, if in fact it is not a necessary god, 
then we would be correct to say that the answer does not go back far enough, but we 
would be wrong to say that this means there could be no answer to the meaning of life. 
It would just not be this particular answer involving a non-necessary god, at least not in 
the final, ultimate analysis. (Returning to our discussion from Chapter 2, we might say 
that this non-necessary god would not sufficiently answer to the meaning of the 
framework of existence, and would merely be a part of the framework itself and 
therefore act as a possible answer to meaning in life.) 
So, we now have it that if we want an answer to the meaning of life we need an ultimate 
explanation for life and existence that narrates across those elements of most existential 
import to human beings. Despite some of the strongest arguments against the legitimacy 
of the question, we have seen that the question is, in fact, legitimate, and that there are 
different metaphysics and epistemologies that can be held which maintain 
epistemological optimism regarding an answer. Transcendental idealism and 
correlationism pose serious threats to this epistemological optimism, but there are 
attempts to combat this threat either by denying the distinction between reality and 
appearance, or by arguing that the world in itself is still knowable through inference or 
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direct experience despite the distinction between reality and appearance. Only by 
undertaking our questioning from within one of these metaphysical and epistemological 
frameworks can our attempts to discover whether there is a meaning of life and what it 
might be potentially be fruitful; if we begin our questioning from a strictly Kantian or 
correlationist standpoint we are doomed at the outset, as these standpoints dictate that 
we can know nothing about a meaning of life, regardless of whether there is one in 
reality or not. But the question of the meaning of life does not, as is sometimes 
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